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The Shape of Things

THE CAPTURE OF KURSK IS PERHAPS THE most significant of the recent series of great Russian victories, for this city of 120,000 inhabitants was one of the chief bastions of the line which the Germans had been expected to defend at all costs. The fact that it has fallen, after being outflanked on the north, without a siege suggests that the German High Command felt unable to risk another Stalingrad. But more than this it indicates lack of confidence in retaining a grip on the eastern Ukraine and probably foreshadows a retreat to the Dnieper. Such a retreat will no doubt prove less costly in man-power than an attempt to hold the present line, but in view of the tremendous momentum of the triumphant Red Army it will be carried out under the kind of pressure that insures heavy losses of men and material. After the catastrophe at Stalingrad, however, and the cutting off of a large part of their Caucasus army the German generals probably feel they have no alternative but to exchange space for time and a chance to reorganize. We can be sure that the Russians will make this task difficult. It might be rendered impossible if Russia's allies were able in the next few weeks to strike in the west.

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SINCE THE WAR BROKE OUT TURKEY HAS loyally adhered to its obligations as a "non-belligerent ally" of Britain. But there have been times when the Turks were painfully conscious of the exposure of their position and felt it necessary to avoid any move that Hitler could interpret as provocative. Against this background of diplomatic caution the recent meeting between President Inonu of Turkey and Premier Churchill stands out all the more sharply. For it constitutes a political slap in the face for the Axis—a gesture which eight months ago would have seemed suicidal to the shrewd statesmen of Ankara. Then Germany was thrusting through the Caucasus toward Turkey's eastern frontiers and hammering at the gates of Alexandria, and all Asia Minor seemed likely to be inclosed by giant pincers. Now the arms of the pincers have been melted in the furnace of war, and Turkey feels secure enough not only to hold military conversations with the British but to advertise the fact. Nothing could better illustrate the

waning mesmeric powers of the Nazi cobra. The military significance of the conference at Adana is harder to assess. We are told that Turkey is to remain neutral, but the array of British and Turkish generals attending the meeting suggests that certain military contingencies were under discussion. It is possible, for instance, that arrangements were perfected for immediate Allied support in case Germany decided on a desperate attempt to overwhelm Turkey. Such an attempt might be a counterstroke to an Anglo-American offensive in the Aegean preparatory to invasion of the Balkans—now more important than ever as a German supply base. Mr. Churchill, however, has warned against speculations of this nature, and it may be wise to leave the riddle to the Nazis, who are evidently feverishly anxious to find out what it all means.

★

SOME CONFUSION HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE announcement that a North African theater of operations has been created under the supreme command of Lieutenant-General Dwight D. Eisenhower. According to the War Department, the new theater will comprise all northwestern Africa but will not affect the commands of the British generals Alexander and Montgomery. But since Montgomery's forces are now crossing the borders of Tripoli into Tunisia, which is in Eisenhower's sphere, it is difficult to see how they can continue to operate under a separate command. The situation may be clarified when protocol has been satisfied by the promotion of Eisenhower to full general, thus making him the equal in rank of Montgomery. But in any case it is clear that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill agreed at Casablanca that the American general would continue to command the Allied forces in North Africa. This is a political decision and one which logically follows the determination of Washington to control North African policy—a determination which the British have preferred not to challenge. From a military point of view the naming as commander of either General Alexander or General Montgomery would have seemed more logical since they have both proved their brilliance in the field. General Eisenhower commands the respect of professional soldiers, and he demonstrated his gifts as an organizer in the launching of the North African expedition. His ability as a strategist, however, has yet to be tested.

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IS MUSSOLINI ATTEMPTING TO MAKE CIANO and his dismissed associates scapegoats for his own failure, or are these discarded gentlemen seeking to disassociate themselves from Il Duce? If the latter is the case, then it implies that somebody in Italy is dreaming of a Darlan maneuver. Credible rumors of divisions within the ruling classes of Italy have recently been circulated. It is known, for instance, that the bankers and industrialists of the Fascist Party have been approaching the mon-

archists, not to overthrow Mussolini but to replace him when he falls. Whatever may be the set-up, it is evident that the total military collapse of Italy in the field, the dissolution of its empire, and the misery of its extorted legions on the Russian front were the immediate causes of the crisis. After Tripoli the war became all too visibly and exclusively a German war. To fight on was to send more peasant lads to their death on the far-off steppes and perhaps to face the invasion of the *patria* itself. To make demands for greater sacrifices without endangering his control, Mussolini probably felt that he must apply even sterner measures of repression. Continental report has it that the would-be Darlans of Italy would not consent. What were these measures? Since Italy is virtually an occupied country, Mussolini may have proposed to stiffen the Italian garrisons with still more German troops.

★

ONE OF THE FOULEST BLOWS IN THE WAR against labor, which some newspapers regard as more important than the struggle against the Axis, was the recent publicity given to a story that merchant seamen had refused to unload a ship at Guadalcanal, claiming that their union agreements forbade Sunday work. This fable first appeared in the Akron *Beacon-Journal*, which ascribed it to reports by unidentified marines and navy men on leave from the Solomons. It was avidly seized upon by the Hearst press and the McCormick-Patterson group of papers, which displayed it under flaring headlines and sauced it with indignant comments from men like Senator Tydings and Representative Howard Smith. Denials by Joseph Curran, president of the National Maritime Union, who pointed out that none of the union's agreements prohibited Sunday work, and by Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller, a marine veteran of Guadalcanal, were ignored or buried by these papers. So too were subsequent emphatic contradictions of the story by Major General Alexander A. Vandergrift, in command at Guadalcanal until December 9, and Admiral William F. Halsey, who added that "the merchant seamen's cooperation, efficiency, and courage, on some occasions in the face of enemy attack, have won high praise." Now members of a House naval subcommittee, after investigating the case, have declared the accusations to be untrue. Clearly the seamen have been outrageously libeled, and the offense is the more cruel because, of all Americans, they at the moment are the most exposed to death and injury. An OWI report just published states that the number of merchant seamen dead and missing during the first year of the war totaled 3,200, or 3.8 per cent of their numbers, compared with a rate of three quarters of 1 per cent for the armed forces. The men who volunteer to sail our freighters, in defiance of the U-boats, need no lessons in patriotism from Messrs. McCormick and Hearst.

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HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL FIGHT ON DIES still flickered as we went to press. Conservatives of both parties in the House, as indicated in I. F. Stone's letter this week, seem more and more convinced of the Texan's unfairness and supported a resolution by Representative Cannon of Missouri for a special committee to hear the evidence against the thirty-eight men and women smeared by Dies. This may save William Pickens, of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, from loss of his job at the Treasury. Pickens, an able and progressive Negro leader, was one of the thirty-eight, and a motion to forbid use of Treasury funds to pay his salary was passed by the House last week. But passage was by the House sitting as a committee of the whole, and another vote was necessary to purge him from the federal pay roll. The immediate consideration sought by Dies last Monday was headed off by the Cannon resolution, which was supported by Taber (Rep.) of New York and McCormack (Dem.) of Massachusetts. The debate drew the extraordinary admission from Dies that while he could not prove Pickens to be a Communist, the suspicion against him was sufficient to warrant dismissal—an interesting sidelight on Dies's conceptions of jurisprudence. *

SHOE RATIONING WAS INAUGURATED BY the Office of Economic Stabilization with a finesse that was sadly lacking at the start of previous rationing schemes. Except for the few radio listeners, who were unwittingly tipped off by Mayor LaGuardia, the public was taken wholly by surprise. There had been no rush to stock up and no hoarding. As a consequence there is a sufficient supply of shoes on hand, and the allowance of three pairs a person a year is generous enough to meet all legitimate needs. Families with a number of small children may be handicapped, but we presume that special provisions will be made for such cases. It is to be hoped that the success of this venture in "snap rationing" will strengthen the hand of the group within the OPA which has long advocated it as a safeguard against hoarding. *

THE DEMAND OF THE SOFT-COAL MINERS for a wage increase of \$2 a day and the action of both the C. I. O. and A. F. of L. in urging a revision of the Little Steel formula has raised a major threat not only to the wage-stabilization scheme but to labor's no-strike pledge. While the C. I. O. is officially committed to the Administration's stabilization program and has announced that it will continue to submit its grievances to the War Labor Board, Lewis's United Mine Workers' Union threatens to go on a rampage if its demands are not granted. The case for some revision of the Little Steel formula is, of course, a compelling one. Living costs have risen more than 5 per cent since the formula was first agreed on. But if the WLB adjusts the formula

to allow for increased living costs, Congress is almost certain to pass legislation increasing farm prices, thus further boosting the cost of living. And a Congressional bloc also threatens to remove that part of the stabilization program that limits earned income to \$25,000 after taxes. Under the circumstances, Byrnes must try to resist all three pressures simultaneously. The best that can be hoped for is probably an orderly retreat that makes some concessions to both labor and the farm bloc, but there can be no granting of such demands as those presented by John L. Lewis. Labor must be made to see that although inflation brings higher money wages it is bound to bring a substantial cut in real wages.

Why not Pay our Taxes?

TAX prospects for 1943 have become no clearer as a result of a week's hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee. It is still fairly certain that some pay-as-you-go plan will ultimately be adopted, but the committee seems bewildered by the half-dozen or so plans that have been proposed for dealing with the 1942 taxes due this year. There seems to be little chance that the Ruml plan, which calls for canceling the 1942 levy, will meet House approval. But it begins to look as if the high-pressure campaign behind the Ruml plan would be effective in obtaining a partial cancelation of these taxes; the Treasury has intimated that it might be willing to collect 1942 taxes at the much lower 1941 rates. Another possibility being considered is the cancelation of the normal tax and first surtax bracket, and the spreading of the remaining payments over a number of years.

Any cancelation of tax liability at this time would of course be open to the same objections as the Ruml plan. It would be bound to have an inflationary effect. Announcement of even a partial cancelation would touch off a buying spree with the money that has been saved for the 1942 taxes, and throwing such an amount of money into circulation at this time would imperil our entire price-control system. While Congress could, as the *New York Times* suggests, put a check to this by doubling the 1943 tax load, it could not very well double existing rates in the higher brackets. The practical result of cancelation, by the Ruml plan or otherwise, would almost certainly be to shift a substantial part of the tax load to the lower-income groups. This, of course, explains the enthusiasm with which certain newspapers and wealthy individuals have hailed the idea.

Changing from our present tax system to a pay-as-you-go plan presents a very real problem. Obviously, most people will not be able to pay two years' taxes in one year. Persons with incomes of more than \$26,000 are now required to pay out 50 per cent or more of their incomes in taxes. Paying two years' taxes in one would take

100 per cent or more of their 1943 incomes. But it happens that these same groups control a large share of the excess spending power that is the major factor in the threat of inflation. This surplus can only be wiped out by tax rates that are considerably higher than the present level. Some surplus spending power exists among all groups subject to the income tax. Since it is estimated that to prevent inflation the 1943 taxes should have been \$15 billion higher than they are, it would seem that at least half of the 1942 taxes should be collected this year in addition to the 1943 taxes on a pay-as-you-go basis. The remaining half might be deferred to 1944.

Such a proposal will hardly have either the organized or the popular support enjoyed by the Ruml plan. But the "sacrifices" it would impose are more nominal than real. The limiting factor in consumption this year is not lack of buying power but lack of goods. This will not be affected one way or another by our tax policies. It is to the interest of a vast majority of Americans—wage-earners, white-collar workers, farmers, and professional men—to head off a disastrous inflation. It is also to their interest to keep the costs of the war from being saddled primarily on the lower and middle income groups. Both of these objectives can best be served by insistence that a large part of the last year's taxes be paid while we are changing to a pay-as-you-go basis.

What About China?

MME WELLINGTON KOO'S suggestion that Chinese resistance might collapse unless more aid was received was, as she herself later pointed out, intended as a dramatic warning to the United Nations rather than as a statement of sober fact. Nevertheless, there can be no question that the Chinese are becoming increasingly restive over our failure to send substantial assistance to them. Mme Koo declared that China is receiving only about 2 per cent of American lend-lease supplies. Despite widespread famine and near-starvation, China is not getting any food from the United Nations.

As a result of being cut off from the outside world, China's economic position has deteriorated seriously in the past two years. Writing from Chungking, Brooks Atkinson recently described in the *New York Times* the extent to which inflation had impoverished the professional and technically skilled groups upon which China's future depends. But although Mme Koo did not say it in so many words, there is reason to believe that the economic distress resulting from our failure to send sufficient aid looms less important in the Chinese mind than the feeling that they have been treated as poor relations among the United Nations. President Roosevelt did not help the situation when he suggested that Chiang Kai-shek was not invited to Casablanca because

China was not in a position to strike against Germany. The fact that Stalin was urgently invited to be present but refused, while Chiang was not even asked, probably rankled, even though it is highly unlikely that the Chinese generalissimo could have been persuaded to make the trip. The failure to invite Chiang was particularly irritating because the Chinese are profoundly upset by the whole trend of United Nations strategy in the Far East. They cannot see why a determined attack is not launched against Burma in preparation for an ultimate crushing attack upon Japan from prepared bases in China. Their view is supported by no less a person than General Chennault himself, who was quoted the other day as saying that with five hundred more combat planes he could run every Japanese out of China and short-circuit Japanese shipping to the Solomons.

Unfortunately, the remedy for this situation is not as simple as it seems. Some Washington dispatches have stressed both the demands of other fronts and the physical difficulty of getting supplies to China. These are real problems, but they are by no means the only ones. The Chinese are right in saying that the amount of assistance they desire is small, and in insisting that if we really want to deliver supplies we should step up the attack on Burma. But although Washington says very little about them, there appear to be political as well as transport complications. It is difficult to get any very precise information on the political situation within China today, but there are disquieting signs of disunity. While Chiang Kai-shek's position is still strong, he seems to have lost ground during the past year. The breach between the powerful Chinese Red Army and right-wing factions in the Kuomintang which led to the liquidation of the Chinese Fourth Army two years ago has never been healed. Several of China's most powerful and best-trained and -equipped armies have been held in a position to oppose the Red Army rather than the Japanese. This is only one of the signs of a disintegration in Chinese political unity which the Japanese have been seeking to exploit to the utmost. Washington has said virtually nothing about the situation, but some officials are known to have been concerned lest our assistance either disturb the equilibrium or aid the pro-fascist elements within the Chungking government. In sharp contrast to its policies in North Africa, the State Department seems to have recognized the danger of strengthening the hand of reactionary groups in China at the expense of popular forces. It is not likely that ideology enters into its considerations, but merely the potential danger that China's reactionaries will turn their weapons against domestic opponents and force a peace with the national enemy.

Despite these political considerations, Mme Koo's warning must not be ignored. If China collapses, the United Nations may, as she says, "lose the war." China should be given a place on the supreme United Nations

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board of strategy. If there is any sound reason why our Pacific war strategy should emphasize the Solomons rather than an offensive through Burma, it should be thrashed out in a United Nations council where the Chinese have a full voice. General Chennault's request for five hundred combat planes should be given fully as much consideration as a similar request from General Doolittle in Africa. Moreover, we should strip our own commercial airlines to the bone, if necessary, to make sure that enough transport planes are sent to carry in the food, medical supplies, and other articles needed to save the Chinese economy from collapse. Where Chinese internal politics enter the picture, however, there is every justification for caution. We must be sure that our influence is on the side of unity and democracy.

The New Expediency

BY FRED KIRCHWEY

THIS story comes from a man who was there. He is a Spaniard who has been working aboard an American ship carrying supplies to North Africa. On the day the American troops landed, the Spanish seaman was visiting a concentration camp in Morocco where some thousands of his Loyalist compatriots are imprisoned. He says the emotion that greeted the arrival of the Americans could only be likened to the feeling in Spain when the Republic was declared in 1931. Men embraced one another and shouted and danced and wept. At last the nightmare of prison and forced labor would be ended. Now the horrors of Vichy-Nazi control would be wiped out. And even while they rejoiced, they prepared to leave their barbed-wire prison.

They are still there.

The Spanish seaman says that when they heard of the deal with Darlan and discovered that the political prisoners would not be released after all—not then—not till later—nobody knew when—the wave of disillusion was frightening. Many men risked their lives to escape. The rest relapsed into a mood of grim bitterness.

The disillusionment in that Spanish prison camp was repeated all over the world—most disastrously in underground France itself. And when the President of the United States felt the blast of disapproval that swept in from every center of Allied resistance, he issued a firm order that anti-Jewish laws in North Africa were to be repealed and anti-fascist prisoners released. His order was not obeyed.

Then came the fortunate death of Darlan, the appointment of Giraud. A second chance, a revival of hope. A few French prisoners were released, the anti-Semitic laws were said to be relaxed. But that was all. The mass of prisoners stayed in jail—Austrians, Jews, most of the

anti-Vichy French, all the thousands of Spanish Loyalists.

But the cold wind of democratic resentment blew up stronger than ever. In the United States, radio commentators and editorial writers, who at first had laid all emphasis on the claims of expediency, began to realize the secondary results of this policy. Within a few weeks the press shifted from general approval of the North African political policy to nearly 100 per cent disapproval. The State Department was properly held to blame for the preparation of the fiasco. Eisenhower was considered the victim of a maneuver which had left him no choice but a bad one; Murphy's long and well-known record as friend of reactionary and defeatist elements in France was suddenly resurrected.

Things got so hot that even the State Department, usually blandly superior to public feeling, shifted to the defensive. Secretary Hull declared himself too much concerned with military affairs to be bothered with political details—a rash remark which exposed him to the obvious retort that political affairs were the chief legitimate business of his department.

Then came Casablanca—and Peyrouton. Not all the build-up and genuine drama of the Roosevelt-Churchill conference, not even the shadows of great military events to come, could compensate for the emotional revulsion that greeted the arrival from distant Argentina of the collaborationist whose one claim to democratic tolerance was his enmity with Laval (as Goebbels might one day offer us his hatred of Göring as a proof of decency).

But actually something did happen on the political front at Casablanca. The ice began to crack. After all, the President—on whom the State Department had generously tried to foist responsibility for the importation of Peyrouton—is peculiarly sensitive to political pressures. Expediency is not of one sort alone. Is it, for instance, expedient for the United States to appear indifferent to those freedoms for which the President has said we are fighting? Is it expedient to forfeit the confidence of every democrat from Chile to Norway? Is it expedient to throw almost the whole press of the United States into a mood of suspicion?

And so several improvements followed the President's visit to our North African front. Political news, for one thing, began to come through. And Americans learned for the first time that the French population of North Africa is not, as apologists for Darlanism had claimed, pro-fascist and pro-Vichy. On the contrary it is reported as overwhelmingly pro-democratic. Nor is it true, as we had heard, that only Vichyites are available for administrative posts. Republican deputies and civil servants of all degrees, ousted from their jobs to make place for men approved by the Nazis, are on hand and if used would command wide popular support. They have not been used.

Some other hopeful things happened. Nine of the men arrested on suspicion by Giraud after Darlan's assassination have been freed. Seven were De Gaullists and actively aided the American landings. A commission is investigating the cases of Freemasons and Jews dismissed from their posts under the Vichy-Nazi laws. Twenty-seven French Communist deputies have been released from prison. And the Joint Allied Commission on Political Prisoners and Refugees has announced that 903 assorted politicals—but no Spaniards—have been let out of prison camps. The anti-Jewish laws are being "relaxed"—but slowly and piecemeal. This caution is supposed to be necessary to prevent the Arabs from becoming alarmed. But when the British walked into Arab Tripoli the other day, the restrictions on Jews were immediately raised and the ghetto opened. No bad results were noted. But of course there's a difference: the British went into Tripoli as conquerors; we went into North Africa as liberators. One wonders whether it is the feelings of the Arabs that are being defended in our end of North Africa or the susceptibilities of the Vichy French who rule there.

The other political fruits of the Casablanca meeting were even smaller. Not only was no political agreement reached between De Gaulle and Giraud; no working plan of collaboration has been made. Catroux has gone to Africa to confer with Giraud, and probably some arrangement for military cooperation will be agreed upon. But the Fighting French have greeted with skepticism the sudden conversion of the Imperial Council into a War Council. They weren't consulted about the change and they don't like Giraud's statement that he has "in his hands all vital interests of the country at war." Does this indicate an ambition to grab power in French territories outside North Africa? If so, all chance of an agreement goes up in smoke. The Fighting French control a sizable empire and rule it successfully under the laws of the Republic. They are not likely to relinquish power to an upstart "War Council" run by Giraud and his Vichyite associates—not even if a couple of De Gaullists are asked to join.

So the gains on the political front boil down to the bare fact that contact has been established and military cooperation may be possible. Not much, perhaps. But it indicates that the President and Mr. Churchill recognize the claims of a new expediency at Casablanca. Having felt the pressure of democratic disapproval, they brought home, not a political victory, but at least a few modest reforms which could be carried out cautiously within the still unbroken framework of appeasement.

And this brings me back to the Spanish prisoners who so joyfully greeted our arrival in Africa. Those Spaniards are not just refugees locked up by a hard-boiled, near-fascist regime. They are a symbol. And they are po-

litical dynamite. Most of them were Loyalist soldiers, the first to resist the fascist enemy. They are hated and feared—and wanted—by the Franco government. Some of the best Republican leaders are still among them.

Correspondents in North Africa have reported that the Loyalist prisoners will be released "when arrangements can be made to ship them to Mexico." But last Friday Secretary Hull was asked in press conference about these men. A news broadcast the same afternoon reported that he said the Allied Commission on Political Prisoners would consult with representatives of General Franco before a decision was made about the disposition of the Loyalists. But next day in a "clarifying" explanation the State Department denied that Franco would be consulted.

What actually did happen? A story by I. F. Stone in *PM* on Sunday gives a sentence-by-sentence account of the press conference in question. It seems that Leigh White, CBS correspondent, commenting on the Spanish Republicans still in prison in North Africa, asked Secretary Hull "whether there were any discussions under way to send these men to Mexico, which had offered them asylum." The Secretary had nothing to say to that. Then White asked whether the State Department would be inclined to listen to any protest the present Spanish government might make in regard to the fate of the Loyalist prisoners. The Secretary replied that "he was sure that there would be every disposition on the part of the American and Spanish and British officials to work in harmony with each other." White pressed the point. Did this mean, he asked, that the Spanish government would be brought into the conferences of the Commission on Political Prisoners? The Spanish, Mr. Hull replied, would "be brought into any conferences pertaining to any of their citizens if and when they may desire to be brought in." It is this strange series of comments that was officially construed next morning as meaning something other than it had been taken to mean.

If the official construction is to be accepted, Mr. Hull's words were simply nonsense. But if the department, in its new awareness of public opinion, realizes the effect such dealings with Franco would have and is now trying to cover its tracks, then we had better go on asking questions till the last Spanish prisoner is safely in Mexico. The appeasement of Franco's regime goes on. That we know. The fact that the Loyalists are still in prison while others have been freed is doubtless due to our tenderness in dealing with the dictator who has butchered thousands upon thousands of their compatriots. Let the State Department follow its "clarifying" explanation with the swift release of all the Spaniards—whether they can take passage for Mexico or not. They will do less harm at large in North Africa than the turncoats who are keeping them in prison. They might even provide a battalion for the armies of liberation. At least they have never made peace with fascism.

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Dies and the Backbone Shortage

BY. I. F. STONE

Washington, February 7

TWO things stand out from last week's debates in Congress on the Dies committee. One is that we have in Dies a very able demagogue who is laying the foundations for a powerful post-war fascist movement in America. The second is that there would be a good chance of defeating him if the Administration had the courage to provide the fight against him with some leadership. Unfortunately the White House seems to be as weak and half-hearted in its domestic as in its foreign policy. The same irresolution that permits a French fascist and anti-Semite to be installed as Governor General of Algeria was scandalously evident on the home front during the past week. Presumably we are engaged in a war against the Axis. Yet a group of diehard isolationists in Congress was strong enough to force the Attorney General to remove William Powers Maloney from the prosecution of the case against the thirty-three alleged seditionists, and a leading member of the President's own party was permitted unrebuked to condone anti-Semitism on the floor of the House of Representatives.

It is true that the President has named an official committee to handle "complaints of subversive activity" by federal employees, and this will be of some puny help in combating Dies. But it is essentially defensive action, and it meets Dies on his own well-chosen ground. To pretend that this is all a serious hunt for Communists is to play into the hands of Dies; even the bitterly anti-Communist *New Leader* maintains that only eight of the thirty-eight officials named by Dies are really Communists. Recent utterances from Berlin show that fear of communism is still the Nazis' chief hope of a negotiated peace. To allow the Dies committee to go on operating is to give Goebbels a sounding board in our midst and to permit American fascism to organize itself at home while we fight the fascist Axis abroad.

The new theme song of the anti-democratic forces in this country is "bureaucracy." Suddenly one hears it echoed on every side as though some smart publicity man had arranged the chorus. When Dies spoke of "a new philosophy which in one country is communism, in another fascism, in another country Nazi-ism, and in another country bureaucracy," he was hitting straight at the New Deal. When Dies said on the floor that the fight against this new philosophy was "more important than the conflict between rival armies" and then changed it in the *Congressional Record* to "of almost equal importance with the conflict between rival armies," he was

making a confession. He was afraid of his own little slip of the tongue, of the revelation that the war Martin Dies is really interested in fighting is the war against democracy at home.

Unlike the Administration, Dies is rarely on the defensive. One of the few instances in which he has been forced into this position occurred last week when the Texan remarked on the floor of the House: "There have come repeated demands that this person or that person be branded as pro-fascist or pro-Nazi simply because he expressed anti-Jewish views." This is the nearest Dies has come to explaining why some of his committee's best friends are Axis agents. Hitler himself could not have surpassed the demagogic sleight-of-hand with which Dies defended himself against his accusers. "I do not hold," he said, in another passage which he himself later expurgated from the *Congressional Record*, "with those who condemn anyone on account of the misdeeds of some people in that [Jewish] race, but there is no law against a man's denouncing the South. God knows I have heard Southerners denounced as viciously in certain quarters of this country as I have ever heard Jews denounced." This may be a non-sequitur to intellectuals, but it was an effective appeal to wounded Southern pride. Dies went on to explain that anti-Semitism is not necessarily fascism and to identify fascism itself with "people who believe in simple, fundamental Americanism, people who believe in preserving our Constitution, people who believe that America shall not fall a victim to maudlin internationalism." One does not answer a speech of this kind by appointing another committee to investigate communism!

Despite the cheers for Dies on Monday, the debate on the floor of the House Friday indicated that he is not unbeatable. The House voted 153 to 146 Friday against a motion which would have barred from public employment the men Dies had named as communistic on Monday. The real issue in the debate was well stated by a Dies supporter, Gifford of Massachusetts. "Almost the entire membership of the House rose and cheered the gentleman from Texas the other day," Gifford said. "Certainly we seemed to have approved his findings. Am I today to be told that each case must be proved before each and every member of the Committee on Appropriations before the findings of the gentleman from Texas and his committee are accepted?" The issue was, indeed, as the exasperated Gifford saw it, a question of confidence in Dies. One conservative Congress-

man after another, men of both parties, from North and South, rose to attack the motion, to defend from their own knowledge one or another of the men Dies had smeared, and to declare that they would not condemn these men without evidence. But if the Dies committee, after all these years of activity and the expenditure of half a million dollars, cannot marshal enough evidence to impress anti-Communists like Dirksen of Illinois and Tarver of Georgia, it is highly vulnerable.

In this, as in other matters, the Administration underestimates the intelligence of the American people. An examination of the press, as of Friday's debate, will show there is enough sense of fair play, of devotion to basic American ideals, and of the realities of the war to overcome the red bogey even on the right. Keefe of Wisconsin, Folger of North Carolina, Ludlow of Indiana, like Hobbs of Alabama in the earlier debates over David Lasser, reflected the strength of the basic traditions we all share. "I am not willing," said Case of South Dakota, "to condemn thirty-eight men and women in

thirty minutes on ex parte presentation without even a specific statement on each one of the individuals concerned. We are supposed to be fighting a war to sustain the Anglo-Saxon idea of justice." And O'Connor of Montana did not speak for himself alone when he cried, "Suppose these men have had communistic leanings? Who in the name of God today are stopping bullets that would be killing our boys? . . . Who are we fighting—Russia or Germany?"

Dies could be beaten if there were available but a little more courage and leadership. Brave young Will Rogers rose on the floor to register his dissent Monday after Dies spoke. Ickes, who has more spunk than the rest of the Cabinet put together, replied to Dies with a scorch. James L. Fly of the Federal Communications Commission stood up like a man before the House Appropriations Committee in his defense of Frederick L. Schuman and William E. Dodd, Jr., against Dies committee charges. Unfortunately, elsewhere in the New Deal the critical shortage is backbone.

The Truth About the A. P.

II. A PRIVATE NEWS PRESERVE

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

TRESPASSERS BEWARE!

IT IS peculiarly appropriate that the Associated Press should have obtained its charter in 1900 under a New York law originally enacted to facilitate the incorporation of clubs for the purpose of acquiring and holding hunting lands and fishing rights. For the A.P. is itself an exclusive club and one that is very much concerned in guarding its preserves from poachers. Its barbed-wire by-laws are designed to prevent the use by non-members both of the news it gathers through its paid staff and of that which it receives from its member papers, under covenant to supply to it, and to it alone, all local news of spontaneous origin.

Moreover, the rules give the A.P. the right to police the relations of its members with other news agencies. An application for an investigation of the A.P. made to the Federal Trade Commission in 1918 by the International News Service cited a number of examples of high-handed action which constituted gross interference with the business arrangements of member newspapers. On one occasion, for example, the New Orleans *Item* subscribed for the leased wire service of the I.N.S., which installed its receiving instrument in the building where this paper was published, although not in the editorial rooms. On learning this, the A.P. served notice on the

publisher that he would lose his membership unless the offending wire was taken right out of the building within twenty-four hours.

Clearly the A.P.'s gamekeepers were powerfully armed. Nevertheless, Melville E. Stone, general manager from 1893 to 1918, was not satisfied with private sanctions; he wanted them reinforced by all the majesty of the law. Long before the foundation of the A.P. of Illinois, he writes in "Fifty Years a Journalist," he had dreamed of legal protection for what he called "property in news." He put the case thus:

First, that to keep pace with the progress of the world there must be a revised definition of the word "property" so that it . . . should include everything having an exchangeable value. This would take it out of the narrow place it had theretofore occupied in legal parlance, and should connote incorporeal rights. Second, there should be a revised definition of the word "publication." I took the ground that the printing of a news telegram in the columns of a newspaper which was sold for one cent a copy should not, and did not, constitute such a publication as would mean abandonment to the public for republication.

What exactly does this mean? Obviously, nobody in the news business is going to claim that any property right

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adheres to the historical event which makes news. For to do so would be to open the way to demands for payment from the owners of places where events having a public interest occurred—for instance, sports arenas or stock exchanges. This would, of course, be as contrary to the interests of newspapers as it would to those of the public. Mr. Stone's objective was different. He considered that when a newspaper or agency had alone developed the news of an event, not merely the form but the content of its report should be protected from use by anyone else, after as well as before publication. This was the new property right for which he sought legal recognition, and its advantages to an organization enjoying a corner in news need not be labored. It should be equally clear, however, that the granting of such a right would be entirely contrary to the public interest, for ownership of a commodity, unless specifically qualified, does not imply any obligation to dedicate it to public use. In other words, the legalization of property in news would mean the legalization of its suppression.

In our legal system news, at least on publication, has always been considered as entering the public domain, and Congress has never been persuaded to alter this situation. In 1883 the Western Associated Press, on a motion by Mr. Stone, appointed a committee to agitate for legislation, and as a result a bill was introduced into the Senate providing for eight hours' copyright protection for published news. But as Henry Watterson, the famous Louisville editor who was a member of the committee, said in his autobiography, the mission was sent on "a fool's errand." The Committee of the Library reported the bill adversely, and nothing more was ever heard of it. In 1899 the A. P. tried again, appointing a committee to investigate the chances of a bill granting property rights in news. It was soon forced to admit defeat.

Mr. Stone stuck to his dream, however, and in 1916 charges that the International News Service was pirating A. P. dispatches gave him an opportunity to apply legal tests to his theory. Curiously enough, in his memoirs he is extremely reticent about the ensuing *cause célèbre*. He allots to it but two-thirds of a page, and his account ignores all the elementary rules of reporting. He does not say who the A. P.'s opponent was, what form the case took, or what was the actual outcome; he merely declares that a "most decisive victory" was won in the Supreme Court, and "thus, thirty-six years after I had settled the equities in my own mind, was the law finally revolutionized."

Oliver Gramling, an A. P. employee, in his history of the organization, is only a little more informative, although he does mention that the final judgment provided for a *mutual* permanent injunction against the appropriation of each other's news by either the I. N. S. or the A. P. But neither of these supposedly authoritative sources gives any inkling of the fact that Justice

Pitney, who delivered the opinion of the majority of the court, very definitely did *not* indorse the principle of property rights in news. On the contrary he said:

But the news element—the information respecting current events contained in the literary production—is not the creation of the writer but is a report of matters that ordinarily are *publici juris*; it is the history of the day. It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Congress "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for a limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.

We need spend no time, however, upon the general question of property in news matter at common law . . . since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question of unfair competition in business. . . . Besides, except for matters improperly disclosed, or published in breach of trust or confidence, or in violation of law, none of which is involved in this branch of the case, *the news of current events may be regarded as common property* [italics added].

It is to be observed that the view we adopt does not result in giving to the complainant the right to monopolize either the gathering or the distribution of the news, or, without complying with the copyright act, to prevent the reproduction of its news articles; but only postpones participation by complainant's competitor in the processes of distribution and reproduction of news that it has not gathered, and only to the extent necessary to prevent that competitor from reaping the fruits of complainant's efforts and expenditure, to the partial exclusion of complainant.

THE A. P. CREATES A "LAW"

The effect of this judgment was to enjoin unfair practices as between competitors, whether by interception of each other's dispatches, bribery of each other's employees, or persistent copying of each other's published news. But it emphatically did not establish any absolute property right in news. Yet for twenty-two years the A. P., trading on its self-advertised reputation for reliability, has persistently spread the idea that in 1918 the Supreme Court declared that news was property. And by so doing it has given additional proof of Hitler's theory that a lie told often enough and loud enough can be made to stick. This one has stuck so long that most newspapermen firmly believe it.

The arrogant persistence with which the A. P. has spread its own version of this Supreme Court decision is best illustrated by the efforts of Kent Cooper, the present general manager, to gain for it the impress of international authority. In August, 1927, at a Conference of Press Experts held at Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations, Mr. Cooper proposed a resolution which included the following passage:

It is desirable that endeavors should be made to secure an international understanding for the unification of legislation in the matter of news on the basis of the following principles: all news obtained by a newspaper or news agency, whatever its form or content . . . shall be regarded as the property of such newspaper or news agency for as long as it retains its commercial value.

Mr. Cooper's recent book, "Barriers Down," conveys an impression that in sponsoring this resolution he enjoyed the support of the two other American agencies represented and that the main opposition came from Lord Riddell, one of the British delegates. Official reports of the conference, however, tell a very different story. They make it clear that the Cooper resolution was decisively blocked by a stirring speech delivered by M. Koenigsberg, representing the International News Service. Emphatically disassociating himself from the supporters of the resolution, Mr. Koenigsberg revealed to the meeting the actual content and meaning of the Supreme Court decision which Mr. Cooper had casually referred to as the legal basis of his case. And he went on to declare that:

Any law that would alienate from public ownership and confer on private ownership one iota of property rights in news would be the prelude to other laws and regulations for extending that alienation, until all property rights in news had departed from the public and were vested in private owners.

As the result of this timely intervention, all chance of passing the Cooper resolution was lost, and in the end a compromise was adopted which conceded that news organizations were entitled to the fruits of their labors after as well as before publication but pointedly excluded any mention of property rights in news. "The adoption of this resolution," wrote Dr. Manley O. Hudson in the *American Journal of International Law* for April, 1928, "signalizes the failure, for the time being, of efforts to secure an international recognition of property in news." Nevertheless, in its own inimitable way the A. P. succeeded in creating victory out of defeat, for its Geneva bureau filed the following story on the conference:

Protection of news against piracy was the basic idea of the resolution adopted today at the International Press Conference after two days of vigorous debate. The doctrine that news is property and must be protected, already observed among American news agencies and newspapers, becomes, by virtue of the resolution, a universal concept. . . . The question involved in the resolution was introduced yesterday by Kent Cooper and unanimously advocated by the American delegates, including Karl A. Bickel of the United Press, Moses Koenigsberg of the International News Service . . . [italics added].

I have told in detail this story of a persistent attempt to imbed a myth in the public mind for three reasons.

In the first place, it illustrates the lengths to which the A. P. has been prepared to go in order to protect the business of those established publishers who enjoy its franchise. Secondly, it helps us to evaluate the testimony of the host of newspaper character witnesses who have declared, apropos of the government anti-trust suit, that the A. P.'s reputation for accurate and impartial reporting is unblemished. Finally, it is essential to clarify this question because, in the course of its answer to the complaint filed by the Department of Justice, the A. P. declares flatly that the government claim that its by-laws constitute an unreasonable restraint upon competition "disregards the established principle of law that news is property of which the owner has the sole right of disposition."

It may be doubted whether, apart from its apparent contempt for the facts, this assertion does anything to strengthen the A. P.'s case. For, assuming for the sake of argument that news is property, would it not be a reasonable inference that it is akin to a commodity? And, in that case, is not the A. P., by restricting the sale of its news to a limited group of members, putting itself in the legal position of an association of steel manufacturers who agree to sell their specialties only to one another—an agreement which would clearly be in unlawful restraint of trade?

"NEWS OF SPONTANEOUS ORIGIN"

The case against the A. P., however, rests on a much more solid foundation—its absolute control of the domestic "news of spontaneous origin" in the morning field. This includes reports of such events as plane accidents, tornadoes, crimes, deaths of celebrities, and other unanticipated noteworthy happenings. Outside a few great cities, where the news agencies are able to maintain fully staffed bureaus, the only method of collecting such news as develops between, say, 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. is through the medium of the local morning papers. And with the exception of the *Chicago Sun*, every exclusively morning newspaper having a daily average circulation of over 25,000 is a member of the A. P. and under contract to supply to it exclusively all local news that might have more than local interest. Taking into account the many smaller morning newspapers in important news centers which are also members, it may be said that the A. P. has control of the news collected by publications having over 90 per cent of the total circulation in the morning field.

It is unfortunate that the complaint of the Department of Justice does not give as much prominence to this angle of the case as it deserves. In attempting to prove monopoly it relies rather on the acknowledged fact that the A. P. is by far the largest news agency in the country, employing more men and spending more money than the United Press and the International News Service combined. And in support of the claim that denial of A. P. service imposes an unfair handicap on a

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paper, it stresses the good-will accumulated by the agency during its long history, the over-all superiority of its service, and "the fact that in the mind of the general public the name Associated Press has long been regarded as synonymous with the highest standards of accurate, non-partisan, and comprehensive news-reporting."

A good many working newspapermen will agree that this is giving the devil altogether more than his due. The A. P. is often stodgy and sometimes slow, and when it tries to handle a story lightly its touch is usually elephantine. So far as foreign news and domestic features are concerned, it encounters real competition from the United Press and, to a lesser extent, from the International News Service. But whatever these agencies may say in their sales letters, they cannot begin to compete in the field of domestic news of spontaneous origin. And by suggesting that they are forced to eke out their reports for morning papers by the use of special correspondents and "string-men," the Department of Justice understates the extent of their disadvantage. For, in fact, there are no such "string-men," since in practically every news center of the country the journalists who might serve in this capacity are employees of A. P. newspapers and, as such, are prohibited from supplying news to other agencies. It follows that a morning newspaper which is excluded from the A. P. cannot obtain from any other source anything like a full service of domestic news. This is a severe competitive handicap.

WHOSE OX IS GORED?

Since, however, all but a handful of papers do enjoy the franchise, it may be asked: Whose ox is gored? One answer is the ox of Mr. Field and a very few other publishers, and this again has been countered by some editorial supporters of the A. P. with the question: Should the Department of Justice set in motion the engines of the law just to further the business interests of one or two publishers? It would be a new principle of law to deny relief from unfair competition on these grounds, but in any case the real victims of the A. P.'s monopoly are millions of members of the general public.

Thanks to the A. P., established publishers have been able to construct a defensive system strong enough to repel all competitors. Moreover, where competition still exists within the intrenchments, it is being rapidly reduced by mergers. Thus the public is being more and more restricted in its choice of newspapers. In Chicago, prior to the advent of the *Sun*, readers were forced either to forgo the morning news altogether, or to swallow the highly individualistic McCormick version of it. And there are many other great cities where you can take the one morning paper or leave it. They include Cleveland, Detroit, Baltimore, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee. Moreover, an increasing number of medium and small cities now have but one morning and one evening paper, both owned by the same firm, which in many

instances also controls the local radio station. Such local monopolies over the sources of news and opinion are not compatible with the healthy functioning of democracy.

It would be absurd to argue that the A. P. is the sole cause of the growing concentration of control in the newspaper industry. Technological changes which have swollen the capital required to found or run a paper have served to keep out the kind of small capitalist who entered the business during the nineteenth century. But the restriction of competition by the A. P. has definitely promoted the movement toward consolidation by multiplying its financial rewards. And there is no doubt that the impossibility of breaking into the A. P.'s



Robert R. McCormick

magic circle in any major city in the country, except by paying a monopoly price for a membership if one happens to be on the market, has discouraged new publishing ventures. Only a rich man can afford to take a chance. But when a Marshall Field invests his capital in a newspaper enterprise, he is assailed as unfair to existing enterprises on the ground that, since he can deduct losses sustained from his personal taxable income, he is, in effect, enjoying a government subsidy. Curiously enough, most of the papers which have echoed this A. P. argument are also strong supporters of the theory that high taxes discourage investment.

The private-enterprise system, it has always been understood in this country, depends for its health on the profit motive being subject to the monitorship of competition. For if the corrective influence of competition is removed, the entrepreneur ceases to be enterprising and seeks satisfaction of the profit motive by raising prices and reducing quality. It is not surprising, therefore, that the newspaper industry in many cities is beginning to show the flabbiness that results from a too sheltered life.

If the Department of Justice wins its suit and breaks down the fence surrounding the established newspapers, we should not expect an immediate flowering of new publications. But the knowledge that one important barrier to competition was down would serve to put every publisher on his toes and encourage him to give greater thought to the satisfaction of his readers lest some outsider should seek to entice them from him.

What would happen if the A. P. won? A legal bless-

ing for its exclusive membership contracts would give a green light to the United Press to take the same road; in fact, it is probable that its customers would insist on contracts affording them the sole right in their fields to U. P. service. Within a strengthened fortress of monopoly we should expect the newspaper industry to grow

increasingly stagnant, increasingly conservative, and increasingly out of touch with public opinion. The men in possession would remain in possession; news would become private property *de facto*; freedom of the press would be changed from a public right to a vested interest. [This is the last of two articles on the Associated Press.]

Men, Jobs, and Politics

BY DERO A. SAUNDERS

ON FEBRUARY 2 the War Manpower Commission announced two important steps, one immediate, the other prospective. The first, the withdrawal of deferment from all men of draft age in sixty-five occupations, stole all the headlines. But buried deep in the news stories was the information that the McNutt agency would shortly present to Congress a "national war-service act" giving the government power to order individual workers to take or keep jobs considered essential to the war effort.

The withdrawal of draft deferment from men engaged in certain superfluous activities is a welcome step, and public thanks are due to General Hershey of Selective Service, John Corson of the United States Employment Service, and a few others, who pushed it through the Manpower Commission's inner councils against considerable opposition. But a compulsory war-service act is something quite different, and the introduction of such a bill in Congress will precipitate a general brawl. Already Congressmen and Senators are clearing their throats; labor leaders have the light of battle in their eyes; editorial writers and columnists are choosing sides and warming up.

Those going forth to battle against compulsion have taken for their text the lofty statement of Bernard Baruch, written back in 1917, castigating the idea of any kind of industrial conscription: "As long as the present industrial organization obtains, industry is in the hands of millions of private employers. It is operated for profit to them. The employee therefore serves in private industry operating for gain. Enforced and involuntary servitude for a private master has been repeatedly and clearly defined by our Supreme Court as slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." The opposition replies heatedly that Britain has a national war-service act, and isn't Britain a democracy? If Britain had to use compulsory methods, why shouldn't we? (The argument strongly resembles a wet-dry debate of the '20's: one side argues from principle, the other from expediency, and neither's arguments have the slightest effect on the other.)

Mr. Baruch's statement so disregards present realities

that it is doubtful whether he himself would defend it today. Industry may be "in the hands of millions of private employers," but it certainly is not at present "operated for profit to them." In war time the employer produces what the government tells him to produce; his profits, his collective-bargaining contracts, and his maximum wages are rigidly supervised by the government. Part or all of his plant may be government property, and if he wilfully fails to produce the materials expected of him, the government can, and does, take over his plant and operate it in the interest of the war effort. If you think industry is free to follow its own whim in war time, just try to imagine General Motors canceling its war contracts!

Nor would compulsory war work represent "enforced and involuntary servitude for a private master." Servitude implies that the master has the right to give any orders he chooses, but no manufacturer would have that power over a draft of industrial workers. Shortsighted employers, dreaming of a national war-service act as a kind of industrial paradise, had better wake up: the moment the worker loses his right to quit, the employer will lose the right to hire or fire whom he chooses, or to use the labor of his employees as he sees fit. That is true in Britain, Canada, and every other country which authorizes compulsory assignment of industrial workers.

The futile quarrel over compulsory or voluntary manpower mobilization results from the failure to understand that no single bold stroke is going to solve the problem. In fact, nothing is going to solve it; the manpower shortage is here for the duration. But by attacking the problem in a dozen ways at once, we can manage, despite the shortage, to build up the vast armed force, grow the food, and turn out the weapons we need.

To meet the need for man-power, millions of gardeners and jewelers and beauticians and clerks will have to be transferred to war jobs; in fact, that was the commission's main object in refusing them further draft deferment. Other millions, chiefly housewives and students, must be trained for their first regular jobs. Employers will be obliged to swallow their prejudices and hire Negroes and aliens; plants will have to stop hoarding

and wasting labor; in many civilian industries production must be "concentrated" in a few plants to release labor and equipment for war work. All these measures must be employed, and at the same time there must be a vigorous approach to the problems of housing, transportation, day nurseries, industrial accidents, labor turnover, absenteeism, better scheduling of production, and so on.


A realistic man-power program will not depend on purely voluntary or purely compulsory methods but on a mixture of persuasion and pressure. Other things being equal, it is not difficult to persuade the average American workman to take the job that best supports the war effort. The man-power administrator therefore must strive to keep those other things equal, so that the worker can follow his desire to support the war he believes in. The chief inducement to enter war work is found in the pay; high wages have played a tremendous part in building a corps of war workers now numbering about 18,000,000. However, there are jobs—in mining and farming, for instance—whose wage levels can't be raised high enough to attract labor without endangering economic stability. And for countless individuals high wages alone are not enough to make them give up home, seniority rights, and other privileges, and move to some overcrowded war-industry town a thousand miles away.

Thus not only inducement but pressure is necessary—pressure on the worker to go where he is most needed and stay there. The most common form of pressure is draft deferment, which now operates in two ways: key industrial and farm workers are deferred; workers in

superfluous industries and occupations are not—regardless of their dependents. (And the Manpower Commission is in earnest when it announces that the list of superfluous occupations is "preliminary" and "will be added to from time to time.") Another form of pressure is economic aid, as in the recent concentration of the gold-mining industry. Late in 1942 most of the gold mines were shut down to conserve vital materials and release skilled miners for the copper and other non-ferrous mines. To make sure that the ex-gold miners went to work in such mines, the War Manpower Commission paid the travel and moving expenses of miners and their families to the places where they were needed.

A cynic might say it makes little difference whether you use compulsion or pressure, so long as the result is the same. But isn't democracy largely a question of *how* things are done? It makes a good deal of difference whether a man is forced to do something or whether that something is made to appear simple, logical, and possible. Americans are familiar with economic and social pressures; in this case the pressures are merely harnessed to a desirable national goal.

The controls of a man-power program can usually be exerted either on the worker or on the employer, but with the obvious exception of draft deferment they should wherever possible be applied via the employer rather than directly on the employee. Most industrial plants today are working on war contracts, and the government obviously has the right to determine how those contracts shall be filled. If the man-power regulations



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injure the employer, then the government can repay the damages. But compulsion of the individual worker nibbles away at his civil rights—a serious loss that can't be repaid in dollars and cents. Our man-power program has to direct the labor of more than 60,000,000 Americans. That is a lot of people. Most of them, however, work for a few thousand employers who have the say about who shall work and what they shall do. Therefore giving directions to the employer is the simplest way of dealing with large groups of workers.

A couple of examples will make this clear. One important step in the man-power program will be "controlled hiring," that is, all hiring in certain critical industries and areas will be done through some agency like the United States Employment Service. Which is simpler: to demand that thousands of individual workers take jobs through the Employment Service, or to regulate and supervise the hiring practices of a few dozen employers? Or suppose it became necessary to require fifty hours of training on the job for every worker in a certain industry. It would be difficult to hound every individual in the industry until he took the necessary training. But it would be entirely practical to make a few employers require the designated training as a condition of further employment.

The soundest measures are those which *make it possible* for the individual worker to do the job necessary to the war effort. Today many persons stay in jobs of no value to the war because they have no other skill. But provision of training facilities is not enough: the average worker can't afford to quit his job and take a training course of several weeks or months. He can fit himself for war work only if he is paid wages while he is training. This fact is going to haunt the Manpower Commission as the number of non-deferrable occupations grows, for the real purpose of listing these occupations is not to sluice men into the armed forces but to push them toward essential occupations.

Other workers badly needed in war industries hang on to non-essential jobs because they can't afford to give up seniority and other rights. They would be willing to make the change if those rights were protected, and if the government paid their travel and moving expenses. This is done in Britain and Canada when a worker is officially asked to take a new job. A housewife with young children is in the same situation. She can't be asked to take a factory job unless a satisfactory day nursery *makes it possible* for her to do so.

In terms of an effective man-power program, the question of "voluntary" versus "compulsory" methods is pretty unimportant. By itself, a national war-service act is only so many words on a piece of paper. The man-power boss can't order workers to do impossible things; if he does, he will just get a million noses thumbed at him. A war-service act has some value when applied

to the recalcitrant worker, but it will solve the really important man-power problems only after solid progress has been made along other lines.

Take training, for example. The War Manpower Commission is proud of having trained some 300,000 foremen and crew chiefs as "job instructors"; it estimates optimistically that these 300,000 men have given some kind of on-the-job training to "more than 4,000,000" other war workers. But there are already 18,000,000 war workers, most of whom could profit from on-the-job training; in fact, a worker needs new training every time he moves up one grade in skill. How can we manage to multiply our on-the-job training program ten or twenty times? "Preemployment training," which prepares a worker for his first war job, must also be greatly expanded. So far preemployment courses have usually trained workers from other jobs who had some sense of work discipline and factory practice. Future courses will be filled with housewives and young girls, most of whom never saw the inside of a factory. Our preemployment training program will have to be adjusted to their needs.

Absenteeism must be cut down. Sickness, accidents, irresponsibility, tiredness, and the like are costing some of our war plants 10 or 15 per cent of their possible man-hours. Labor hoarding must be stopped—employers' wasting of skilled workers at a time when our few skilled men must be spread around as thin as frost on a window-pane. The community problems must be tackled—housing, overcrowded schools, transportation near the breaking-point, too few doctors, inadequate water supply. And if he solves all these, the man-power boss can still go crazy trying to allocate our total man-power among industry, agriculture, and the armed forces.

One approach to the man-power problem guaranteed to fail is the political approach. The compulsory war-service act advanced by Grenville Clark, the New York lawyer who drafted the Selective Service Act, contains a provision that "no person shall be obliged to join any union or organization of employees as a condition of employment under this act." This innocent-sounding clause in effect sets aside all closed-shop, maintenance-of-membership, and preferential-shop contracts for workers ordered into jobs by authority of the act. Mr. Clark maintains that it would be unfair to require union membership of anyone compelled to take a certain job—a touching concern for individual rights on the part of a man proposing that we allow the man-power administrator to order workers from job to job at will. The astute Paul McNutt is unlikely to include any such provision in his commission's national-service proposal. One thing is certain: any bill containing such a clause will be vehemently opposed by organized labor and ardently supported by groups hostile to labor, without the slightest regard for the bill's intrinsic merits.

Political strife will also be aroused by the proposal to

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attack the man-power problem by repealing the Wage-Hour Act—usually called with calculated inaccuracy "the forty-hour-week law." The truth is that in October, 1942 (the latest month for which figures are available), war workers were putting in much more than forty hours a week. In the durable-goods industries as a whole, which include most war industries but also a number of others whose production has been sharply curtailed, employees worked on the average 45.7 hours a week. Key war industries had a still longer work week: in firearms, it was 49.0; in electrical equipment, 47.0; in engines and turbines, 49.7; in machine tools, 52.5; in aircraft and parts, 46.3; in aircraft engines, 48.0; in shipbuilding, 47.6. These figures do not include time off for sickness, accidents, or other causes; if this were reckoned in, the *scheduled* work week would be two to six hours longer. In a number of war industries the work week is probably too long, not too short. As Britain found after Dunkirk, the point can easily be reached where longer hours actually diminish production instead of increasing it. This point has probably been passed by the machine-tool industry, which must work on a schedule approaching sixty hours per shift in order to get an average of 52.5 hours per employee.

The real purpose of the campaign against the Wage-Hour Act is to cut wages, not increase hours. Since a hundred billion dollars' worth of war contracts, as well as all price ceilings, have been calculated on the basis of overtime pay after forty hours, a revision of that basis

would bring a profit windfall to employers. The resultant angry demands for wage increases are not pleasant to anticipate.

Another piece of calculated nonsense is the claim that the man-power shortage could be solved in a jiffy by firing government employees. The latest figures (for October, 1942) show 2,687,000 civilian employees in the executive branch of the government. About two-thirds of these are working for the War and Navy departments, chiefly in arsenals, docks, navy yards, proving grounds, supply depots, and construction work. More than seven-eighths of the increase in federal employment since October, 1941, has been in these two departments. Since even Senator Byrd is unlikely to tamper with army and navy requirements, any sweeping claim about the man-power to be gained by firing government employees can be ignored for what it is—political tub-thumping born of the desire to hamper some agency a particular legislator doesn't like.

There is no law that says we have to be sensible about the man-power shortage. We can go on bickering about government employees and union privileges and the Wage-Hour Act. We can spend months in a futile free-for-all over a war-service act. But while we waste time on panaceas, steadily refusing to see the problem as a whole, let us remember one thing: every tick of the clock brings us closer to next September, when the harvest peak is going to bring a genuine, Grade-A, total man-power shortage.

Washington Metternichs

BY LUCIEN VOGEL

SLOWLY but surely a pattern is beginning to emerge out of the seemingly inexplicable policies of the American State Department. The deal with Admiral Darlan, the installation of the so-called Council of the French Empire to assist General Giraud, the flirtation with "Otto of Austria," the continued benevolence toward General Franco—all these point to an over-all policy which can no longer be thought of merely in terms of "appeasement." They constitute what might better be termed a "policy of legitimacy."

This principle of legitimacy reaches far back into diplomatic history. It was perhaps most clearly demonstrated at the Congress of Vienna, when Metternich, representing the conquerors, and Talleyrand, representing the defeated French Empire, together restored Europe's most discredited dynasties. In its contemporary manifestations legitimacy is supported by representatives of the conservative upper classes of all the United Na-

tions, in the governments, the general staffs, business, and of course the drawing-rooms. Though they no longer say, as they did in every country until September, 1939, "Rather Hitler than Stalin," the protagonists of this policy are still hypnotized by the fear of revolution, either during or after the war.

There is of course no question, as there was in 1814, of restoring dynasties. The object is merely to build a bridge between the state of war and the state of peace, between the present and the future, in all the countries which are to be freed by the United Nations. These administrative bridges, or interim regimes, are to be composed of elements now in power or those connected with them; only those will be discarded whose presence would jeopardize the success of the whole operation by clearly inviting revolution.

Legitimacy fits in with the aims of the Vatican, which has in fact through its ambassadors and dignitaries

played a considerable part in the direction of this policy in all countries; its role is that of liaison agent, testing the ground and preparing various solutions for individual cases within the framework of the general principle.



Archduke Otto

A policy of legitimacy is based on the following tenets:

1. The aggressor states can be defeated by force of arms alone; it is unnecessary to depend on popular revolt either in these states or in the countries they have invaded.
2. On the contrary, such revolt is undesirable, since it would involve civil disorder and would carry a threat to the traditional pre-fascist types of government.

3. Therefore all solutions, however they may vary to fit individual situations, must have one purpose: to forestall revolution in nations now dominated by fascism.

4. The preparation of these solutions will in itself contribute to a more rapid victory than would encouragement to revolution, since they envisage dealing with certain persons already in positions of power, who would merely have to replace the officially responsible leaders. It makes no difference whether or not these elements are fascist in sympathy, provided they can be passed off as moderate.

5. If the continuation of legitimacy cannot be assured in advance by shifts within the established government, it will be necessary to canalize revolutionary sentiment behind a picked team of well-known men whose attitude toward the traditional order can be depended on.

6. In this case it is not necessarily the former democratic leaders who are to be designated to succeed the fascists. Quite the contrary. In certain instances these leaders or parties do not give sufficient assurance of their inclination to uphold the traditional pre-fascist order, and it will be necessary to seek legitimacy farther in the past, and to smooth the way for the return of more dependable conservative elements.

7. Such solutions must be prepared not only for enemy and enemy-dominated countries but also for such neutral countries as Spain, which, because they are fascist, are likely to be drawn into any revolutionary upheaval in Europe.

8. The development and application of these solutions can be assured only by the cooperation of the traditional pre-fascist elements of order in all countries,

enemy and Allied alike: that is, the diplomatic corps, the army, the high clergy, finance and big industry, and in some cases the large landowners.

9. Once such regimes are established, it will be left to them to restore the traditional order in their own way.

The purposes of legitimacy, in short, can be summed up thus: Win the war—yes; unleash revolution—no; risk communism—never.

Let me say here that I am not one of those who can look forward without misgivings to the prospect of a wave of even justifiable revenge sweeping over Europe, with the continuing atrocities it would involve. Passionately eager as I am to see human progress, I do not believe violent revolution is the only way it can be promoted. But I should like to call the attention of our modern Metternichs and Talleyrands to some of the possible consequences of their policy. Let us consider an example from recent history.

In 1918 a French general, Franchet d'Espérey, ascending the Vardar River, broke the power of Austria-Hungary. After the flight of the Emperor Charles, Count Michael Karolyi, a member of the Hungarian Chamber, who alone during the entire war protested to the chamber against Hungary's alliance with Germany, assumed leadership of the government. The Hungarian people were sure that Karolyi, a friend of France and a heroic rebel against his own landowner class, whose fortunes were bound up with Germany's, would be welcomed as an ally by the French soldiers of liberty—it was not yet called democracy in Europe. But in the eyes of General d'Espérey, Count Karolyi was not "legitimate." Because he had given his lands to his peasants on the first day of the revolution, his peers had become his most implacable enemies. In a very few days they organized a white army and won the favor of General d'Espérey. Instead of recognizing Karolyi's government and making efforts to get food to the famished population of Hungary, d'Espérey collaborated with the white army in establishing a *cordon sanitaire* around Karolyi and refused to establish diplomatic contact with his government.

In Budapest there was not as yet a single Communist union; all the labor groups were Social Democratic. Overnight, faced with the fact that Karolyi was totally unable to negotiate with the French government, all the unions yielded to the arguments of a handful of Communist agitators. Karolyi, realizing that he was powerless, released from prison the Communist leader, Bela Kun, and turned the government over to him. Then followed the short-lived Communist regime and after it the terrible white repression—which probably did not displease the legitimist General d'Espérey.

If in this war similar efforts on a grand scale are made to maintain or restore outmoded social, economic, and political arrangements, is there not great risk of un-

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leashing a Continent-wide revolution of despair? Is there not danger that the suffering peoples may see in revolution their only chance of punishing the fascist executioners and their collaborators, the traitors to democracy? Is there not, specifically, the danger that the people may see in communism their only hope and in Moscow their only ally? Further, is it not possible that the U. S. S. R. may see in the policies of the neo-legitimists a revival of the old anti-Soviet front, under the guise of an anti-

revolutionary one? Many keen observers are convinced that Moscow does not have the slightest intention of meddling in European affairs after the war. But in view of the neo-legitimist machinations, may not Moscow think its counter-intervention necessary for the defense of the national interests of the Russian people? This counter-intervention could take only one form—aid to revolutionary elements in proportion to their Communist tendencies.

What Your Money Won't Buy

BY WILLIAM H. JORDY

IMAGINE a European standing in front of one of our department-store windows in this winter of 1943. He would stare unbelievably at the abundance remaining after a year of total war. For another indication of just how little the American consumer has felt the war, a European might be interested in leafing through the current Sears, Roebuck catalogue, which omits only 103 of the thousands of articles included in previous editions. The principal items lacking are metal products; three textile, two lumber, and four rubber products complete the list. Sales of a few other articles are restricted; stocks of some have been depleted since the catalogue's publication.

The magic behind the abundance still visible in this country is found in our merchants' huge 1942 inventories. As the following table shows, the big firms had on hand last year a quantity of goods twice or more as large, in proportion to their sales, as they had in 1939, the year preceding the war.

	1939 average supply	June 30, 1942 average supply
Furs	3.2	33.21
Blankets, linens	3.5	7.62
Household appliances	2.8	7.31
Furniture	4.1	6.22
Men's clothing	4.8	5.98
Main store (ground floor)	3.2	4.82
Women's and children's hose	2.0	4.37
Basement store	2.3	3.41

* Figures represent stocks on hand, or supply, by months, in relation to sales, and were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board and the National Dry Goods Association through the WPH.

After war broke out in 1939, the department stores led all merchants in frantically stuffing their warehouses. At the end of June, 1942, their inventories had reached a peak. Since June a lot of money has gone into the till, and a lot of goods have been handed over the coun-

ter. Christmas shopping, 20 per cent higher than the year before, with prices up only 5 per cent, eroded the stock mountain to a foothill. Probably a large part of the consumers' goods displayed so lavishly in store windows through the fall and advertised by the mail-order houses was stacked under Christmas trees in December. In almost all commodities what remains of the inventories of last June, plus all subsequent buying, will not stretch beyond the next few months. The only thing which can upset this prediction—and the business and trade journals are beginning to anticipate it—will be compromises in favor of something less than all-out civilian sacrifices. Barring this, what is the outlook for the consumer?

One thing is certain: no one need fear shortages of food, shelter, or clothing that will jeopardize health. As early as the middle of November, James F. Byrnes, director of the Office of Economic Stabilization, requested the Office of Civilian Supply to "undertake a study to determine what are our bedrock minimum civilian needs consistent with fullest war production." While this inquiry indicated that the government was sternly bent on eliminating the tinsel from American buying, it also showed that genuine needs would be considered. Of the three essentials, food and shelter need not be discussed here, for they have been separated from the rest of the consumer market. Food is being rationed whenever a shortage appears, and construction, except for necessary repairs, is limited to war factories and housing. The suddenness with which shoe rationing was announced, surprising even the manufacturers, who had predicted no rationing before next fall, has protected inventories and thus assured the average civilian of being as well shod as normally. The announcement makes point rationing of all clothing virtually certain as soon as the new ration books are issued; without rationing the impending shortages of cotton work clothes and woollen underwear can scarcely be forestalled. Although linens, silks, and most synthetic fibres are off the market,

and rayon supplies will dwindle, the cotton and woolen industries have now reached a high point in war production which is expected neither to increase nor decrease in the immediate future. Some excess supplies of wool, frozen early last year for war demands, have already been released for civilian use. And the government is so certain that there is enough cotton to meet both military and civilian needs that it plans to reduce the cotton acreage.

The immediate future also looks bright in a few other commodities in which exceptionally large inventories will counterbalance expected man-power and raw-material shortages. Enough of most drugs, cosmetics, and paints can be promised, and the consumer can spend his dollars as usual on whiskey and furs, of both of which there is a two or three years' supply on hand. Of course, if the views of many small business men prevail, Brown will remove all price ceilings on luxuries and semi-luxuries. Under-the-counter supplies will then allow us to buy these products a little longer—but we shall pay heavily for the privilege.

Except for the three basic essentials and a few commodities with exceptionally high inventories, the consumer's dollar may buy him nothing. The reason, of course, is the shortage of man-power and raw materials. No industry unessential to both civilian and war production expects to keep its man-power. Most industries took steps to convert to war production before government controls caught up with them; WPB spokesmen are now turning the heat on the stragglers. Specifically, the furniture, toy, and mattress industries face a reduction in man-power of 80 per cent, carpets of 90 per cent, and the luxury industries, such as furs, cosmetics, and amusements, fully as much.

But even a small amount of man-power could produce a considerable quantity of goods for the consumer market if the materials were obtainable. Nothing reveals the tremendous supply of materials required for global war more strikingly than a case study of those industries which only a year ago buoyantly expected to crash the consumers' durable-goods field. Now, they thought, while the metal industries were off to the Crusades, was a chance to redesign products and poach on this richest of all preserves. The four industries most hopeful of trespassing were lumber, paper, glass, and plastics.

Take lumber. A year ago the lumber industry predicted a boom market in substitutes for metals in civilian construction, furniture, and novelties. But steadily increasing metal shortages soon pressed lumber into hundreds of unforeseen military uses. In 1918 the government spent \$28,000,000 for wooden housing, but last year it spent nearly eight and a half billion. Makers of truck trailers, mine-sweepers, and sub-chasers for the armed forces, once large metal users, now depend upon lumber. Plywoods impregnated with plastics are substituting for light metals in airplanes and patrol boats.

As a result, the lumber industry has fallen six billion board feet short of meeting essential requirements, despite increased production.

The next question is: What materials can replace lumber? Chemicals and lubricating oils, shipped in steel drums before the war, were subsequently packed in wooden barrels, then shifted to heavy laminated-paper drums. Now the government wants the paper industry to develop new fiber compounds which will divert from lumber the demands of crating and boxing, which ordinarily take 15 per cent of total yearly lumber production. If paper does free this lumber for other uses, a product condemned a year ago as a luxury becomes as essential as lumber. The paper industry is now neatly balanced between civilian and war needs, with wrappings and containers for the armed forces and writing paper for official Washington slightly tipping the scales for war production. This new load will take a good deal of paper away from the consumer. Meanwhile, the National Housing Administration is frantically redesigning construction to make more use of the brick and gypsum industries, which last year operated at only 30 per cent of capacity. By progressive substitution, therefore, one industry after another is drafted out of the consumer market.

Glass is in the category with brick and gypsum to the extent that it could expand production if more purposes for which it could be used were discovered. Its most extensive use as a substitute has been in packaging numerous products which traditionally went into tin. Glassware for cooking, developed during the last war, is again replacing aluminum. The same sturdy, heat-proof glass developed for cooking ware makes excellent stove and washing-machine tops, but such tops will not be needed unless metal for other parts is released. Glass grates for fireplaces are advertised in New York newspapers. Glass brick may be increasingly used in housing projects; glass sinks and even glass plumbing seem quite likely. But structural glass is not a low-cost material, and low-cost housing is all that is being built now. Glass and china will be as plentiful as man-power controls permit.

What about plastics? Here the government is choosing for the consumer. Plastics are extensively used in war production. The toughest of them, the phenolics, go into electrical apparatus and into impregnated plywood for airplane and torpedo-boat construction; the transparent acrylics go into inclosed cockpits and bomber noses; the ureas into buttons, dials, and casings; and so on down to the synthetic fiber, polyvinyl chloride, which is used for cable coverings and self-sealing gasoline-tank linings. Three plastics are left for consumers, and of these the war will probably soon take two. One, a new compound of non-priority wood paste and ligno-cellulose, will probably be added to the ureas; another, polystyrene, requires the same styrene that is already reserved for Buna S

In the Wind

rubber. The third, the acetates, could be made available for the consumer in limited amounts. Acetates could be manufactured into costume jewelry, combs, toilet articles, lighting equipment, pen and pencil barrels, and similar novelties. Also the government hopes that an acetate bottle cap can be developed strong enough to withstand carbonization and thus free enough metal now affixed to the nation's soft-drink and beer bottles to build ten destroyers a year. But there is only enough acetate for the bottle tops. If they are perfected, there will be no acetate novelties for the duration.

Thus industries which expected to produce largely for the consumer have been forced into war work. From the manufacturers' point of view there is little doubt that the Office of Civilian Supply's "bedrock minimum" for the civilian will not look very promising. But once the basic requirements for civilian consumption have been determined, scientific redistribution of man-power can begin, and the soundest combination of taxation and compulsory savings can be applied to restrict purchases. Upon this minimum, too, depends the proportional distribution of consumers' goods. The inventory control to be inaugurated this March, which provides that wholesalers and retailers can replace stocks in accordance with their inventory-to-sales ratio for "normal" years, is meaningless unless the total production of every commodity in relation to its production during "normal" years is known. Only then can replacement buying be reduced by the same percentage by which production is curtailed, thus assuring a fair share of whatever is produced to the smallest retailers. Finally, only when the civilian minimum is known can civilian production be geared to war production. As long as bulging inventories acted as a cushion against the overnight disappearance of materials to meet new projects in war production, long-range planning for civilian production was less necessary. Haphazard planning, however, must cease when inventories are exhausted, or consumer goods will fluctuate between unhealthy scarcity and unnecessary abundance. If the war lasts long enough, really efficient planning of production will mean, as in England, that the manufacture of every commodity must be concentrated in a few factories in each industry. It will mean standardization.

So far our government has gone only part way along this road. It has allocated raw materials. It has threatened to restrict man-power. It has cut 12,200 manufactured items to 3,400, thus saving 1,500,000 tons of metal and 135,000,000 yards of cloth. Although concentration of manufacture is opposed by business interests, Donald Nelson has mentioned it as a strong possibility. Thus, slowly, the satisfied citizen of the richest country in the world gets a tiny taste of total war. His shop windows will be emptier, his Sears, Roebuck catalogue thinner. But he will still get away cheaply compared to the citizens of any other country on the globe.

NORWEGIAN SOURCES report that the Nazis have commandeered 25 per cent of the 150,000 reindeer in Lapland and are shipping them to the northern Russian front. The deer are noted for their speed in running over snow.

JOHN BRACKEN, new leader of Canada's Progressive Conservative Party, is now promoting the Ruml plan in that country.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK National Council reports that two hundred camps have been established in Bohemia and Moravia for children evacuated from western Germany and Berlin.

THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE of the United States is sending its members a questionnaire to find out how much man-power could be saved if employers didn't have to pay "penalty overtime" for work in excess of forty hours a week. The bulletin announcing the questionnaire says, "The company need not sign its name. In fact, anonymity is requested."

FROM POLISH UNDERGROUND sources comes word of a new game played by Poland's children when Germans are not in sight. The children divide into two groups; half of them line up against a wall, and the other half, using sticks for guns, shoot them down. Everybody wants to be a victim, nobody a Nazi.

THE JAPANESE NEWSPAPER *Asahi* comments thus on the difficulty of taking over Australia: "As this race enjoys complete freedom, great obstacles must be overcome to make it cooperate with Japan as a member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to make it grasp peacefully the significance of our new order."

SONS OR BUTTER?—A New Hampshire woman writes to the editor of the *Boston Post*: "I think Senator La Follette is right—our butter should be kept for our people here at home. I have five brothers in the service. I am willing to do my share, but there is such a thing as going too far."

A SURVEY by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Denver shows that last March 57 per cent of the people interviewed believed factory workers were doing all they could do to help win the war; in July the figure was 63 per cent; this month it is 69 per cent.

TRAFFIC NOTES: The ban on pleasure driving, according to an OPA ruling, does not cover driving to union meetings. . . . The *Baltimore Union News* (not a union paper) says the ban will have a bad effect on the marriage rate in rural areas.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

POLITICAL WAR

EDITED BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

Survey of Latin America

BY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

[The impressions described in this article were gained in the course of a visit to most of the Latin American countries made by the author in his capacity as president of the C. T. A. L. (Confederation of Workers of Latin America). Señor Lombardo Toledano has just come to the United States to confer with the leaders of the C. I. O and A. F. of L. on the results of his trip.]

Mexico, January 30

I HAVE lately returned from a journey through Latin America in the course of which I visited eleven countries—actually, I might say, twelve, for on returning to Mexico I saw my own country with fresh eyes. Since I was also in direct touch with eight other countries, I feel that I am now in a position to express myself with some authority on the desires and aims of the Latin American people.

For in spite of local diversities it is not incorrect to speak of a single people, a people with the same faith and the same hope. Whether they are Indian, mulatto, black, or white, their passion for freedom has swept away racial differences. Peasants chained to serfdom, miners whose lot is a black page in the history of Latin America, a middle class which marks the transition from a feudal economy to the new industrialism, youth in universities, in trade unions, and in farm groups—all are tense and expectant. All sense the oncoming of a new spring, the beginning of an era of humanity and justice.

Of course, each country has its particular problems which have been aggravated by the war. Take Cuba as an example. Its ports, empty of ships, teem with jobless sailors and workers. A large part of the 1940 and 1941 sugar crops is piled in warehouses. The government is attempting to meet the social and economic problems arising from these conditions by providing unemployment compensation, mobilizing the country's resources, and raising wages. Social reform, however, runs up against the obstacle of the *latifundios*, the vast estates owned by a few wealthy families who keep the land unproductive while masses of poverty-stricken peasants have no work.

Colombia, which I covered from the Caribbean coast to the frontier of Ecuador, is full of local color for the tourist, but from the social point of view it is far from attractive. Here modern history dates from only ten years ago, at which time a liberal regime was inaugu-

rated by the present President, Alfonso Lopez. Colombia is trying to extricate itself from feudalism, but the old forms do not die easily. In the rural areas you see rich landowners surrounded by peasants barely able to subsist. In more remote corners you come upon forgotten Indians paying their feudal tribute—*diezmos* and *onceno*—just as they did in the seventeenth century. On the coast mulattos and blacks, though they do their share of the country's work, are not considered part of the proletariat and enjoy none of the benefits of social legislation. They form a backwash of people unincorporated in the economic life of the country. Scattered through the entire picture is the clergy, rich, dominant, and militant—a clergy so powerful that it can afford the luxury of a "right wing" accepting no discipline but its own and able to ignore papal nuncios. Its publication, *El Siglo*, a political relic of a bygone age, is unique in the modern world. Against this medieval Colombia are ranged the liberals, the intellectuals, and the proletariat of the younger generation.

Crossing into Ecuador, one gets the impression of a dismembered body. The dissatisfaction, the despair, of the people is evident everywhere. Physically the most beautiful in all South America, they are human material for a potentially happy country. But in the face of a class economy which permits ownership of the land to remain in the hands of a very few, there are no real political parties and up to now no group with a program designed to meet the national need. The hope for the future rests with the Confederación de Trabajadores, now in formation, which is attempting to bring together the most important labor groups of the country.

Peru can be thought of as three countries in one: the cities, of Spanish origin; the region of the Andes, with its native population; and the Amazon country, with a deadly climate, almost uninhabited, but possessing enormous potential wealth. In Peru the Indian has met his classic fate. Pushed first toward the coast, then toward the mountains, he has finally landed in the Amazon region. A few progressive villages are evidence of what could be done with these people were a farsighted and constructive social program adopted. But for ten years the country has been in a state of civil war, even if no shot has been fired. An oligarchy dominates a people which has so far failed to develop effective popular parties. And as in the other countries of Latin America not yet free from feudalism, the middle class makes the

mistake of supporting the landowners instead of joining with the proletariat.

In Chile, by contrast, I breathed the fresh air of a functioning democracy. I saw all social classes participating in its political life. Women are more active there than in any other country in Latin America. Shoulder to shoulder with the powerful labor organizations stand large sections of the middle class, convinced that good relations with the workers form the only defense against a new reactionary wave.

To know the Bolivian people one must visit the Altiplano. This is the saddest region in the world. The soil is poor; the lack of water tragic. It would be ironic to speak of housing. A Quiché song tells of the peasants of the Altiplano who go about "*vestido de viento y de frío*," clothed in wind and cold. Shadowing everything is their habitual use of coca. It is coca which keeps the Indians in a state of apathy, physical and moral, but without its help they could hardly go on living. The aristocracy lives in La Paz, but it is an aristocracy in name only, for it barely scrapes along on the income derived from Indian labor. Mining, the real wealth of the country, is in the hands of three firms—Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild. Lacking a seaport, Bolivia is an easy prey to foreign capital.

The other countries I visited were much the same as those I have described. In Costa Rica the accomplishments of the Confederation of Workers have been outstanding. It radiates hope throughout Central America.

But in Central America, as everywhere else in Latin America, the need for closer solidarity between all workers is urgent.

The necessity for inter-American collaboration is now fully appreciated by the enlightened people of Latin America. In all the countries I visited the movement toward unity was apparent, and everywhere it was understood that labor unity must constitute the principal basis for cooperation between the progressive elements in each country.

In the pursuit of hemispheric collaboration the Good Neighbor policy offers considerable hope, but the practices of some North American enterprises stand in the way of its effective realization. The identity of interests and point of view between the North American capitalist groups which have exploited Latin America and the Latin American oligarchies which serve them constitutes a permanent menace to democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Only a clearly stated and practically instrumented post-war policy can change the situation. As things are, the deep distrust of the future plans of the United States felt by Latin Americans has provided fertile ground for Nazi propagandists. The people of Latin America could render much greater support to the cause of the United Nations, both in supplying raw materials and in the military field, but they must have the incentive of knowing that they will be given an opportunity to participate in the reorganization of the world. They must have reason to expect to be treated as equals at the peace



FIGHTING A DOUBLE ENEMY

Drawing by Arias Bernal

table, and must be given something more tangible to hope for than has yet been suggested in rhetorical declarations of brotherhood.

What the Latin American people want to see incorporated in the peace can be summed up as the liquidation of feudalism; the raising of the standard of living of the peasant masses, a standard so low that it has chained Latin American countries to a primitive economy and kept them subject to foreign capital; industrialization running parallel to agricultural development; a system of exchange of goods that will compensate the Latin American countries for the possible loss of European markets.

The end of the war will bring a cry for the revision of political constitutions, for the end of oligarchic dictatorship, and for the introduction of social and economic democracy. Such a transformation will require new political instruments. Only new progressive parties supported by strong labor movements can inspire the masses with a new faith—a positive democratic faith to supplant the negative mysticism of fascism which threatens to pull them back through the centuries to the old Spanish colonial system.

As a step toward the realization of the aims summarized above, the Confederation of Workers of Latin America has formulated a program which it will present to representative organizations of the Western Hemisphere for consideration. To help solve the region's immediate social and economic problems it makes the following proposals:

1. The economy of every Latin American country should be placed at once on a war footing. Production, distribution, and consumption of all goods vital to the needs of the people or suitable for export should be under the control of the state.

2. For every commodity produced for export, a tripartite commission representing producers, workers, and the state should be created. The commission should fix prices for sales abroad, bearing in mind the need for obtaining a better living standard for the workers, legitimate profits for producers, and taxes which will enable the state to enter upon a program of general national improvement.

3. The government of the United States, which is the chief buyer of strategic materials from Latin America, should in its contracts incorporate a clause whereby the seller is obliged not only to increase the workers' wages and improve their standards of health and housing, but also to devote a part of the profits accruing from the sales to furthering the production of war materials.

4. In every country a committee for the regulation of imports should be established, in order to coordinate the needs of the consumer with the demands of the war effort.

5. A more equitable distribution among the various

countries of certain products, notably oil, should be secured in the interest of intensified production for inter-American defense.

6. Latin American countries must learn to develop their productive capacity without depending entirely upon machinery from the United States, which cannot always be obtained in the desired quantities.

7. It is essential that wherever native hand labor is employed in war production, a special law be passed protecting the natives against abuse and exploitation, and calling for a tax levy to provide them with better living conditions.

The post-war program of the Confederation includes the following points:

1. The twenty nations of Latin America must take advantage of this unique opportunity which history offers them and present a united front at the peace conference. Backed by the United States and the other signatories of the Atlantic Charter, they must insist upon their right as quasi-colonial countries to be given an opportunity for self-development.

2. The living standard of the great masses of the working population must be raised.

3. The quasi-feudal structure of certain Latin American countries must be altered by means of agrarian reforms which will give land to the peasants and guarantee them the necessary credit to begin its cultivation. This should be under state direction or control.

4. The democratic principles voiced in the several constitutions must be honestly applied. Individual and collective rights must be guaranteed—the right to work, the right to be educated, the right to participate in civil and political life. A planned economy for the South American continent should be instituted. An educational system should be set up that will insure the teaching of certain common ideals and educate the new generation in the principles of democracy.

5. Latin American problems must be considered in their interrelated aspect. Each nation should be ready and obliged to defend the security of the continent as part of its own security, and to come to the help of the other nations not only in international crises but when assistance is needed in solving social and economic problems. There must be cooperation in the settlement of such urgent problems as (a) the Ecuador-Peru territorial dispute; (b) the freedom of Puerto Rico; (c) a seaport for Bolivia.

These are some of the ideals and objectives for which people are clamoring throughout Latin America. But to achieve them it is necessary first to win the war, and to win it truly. The people of Latin America stand opposed to peace without victory, to a negotiated peace, to a peace with fascism. They want a victory of democracy in its deepest sense. They want a people's victory "everywhere in the world."

Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

TWICE in succession this column has announced that a *levée en masse* was being prepared in Germany. The signs were not deceiving: what has been hinted for weeks is now on the table. Officially it is called total mobilization. Goebbels gives it a more dramatic name. "We answer the impudent and overbearing victory claims of bolshevism and plutocracy," he said on January 30, "with a great popular upsurge of national effort." "From all strata of the population the cry for a total war effort has besieged the ear of the leadership."

Actually Germany was already to an enormous extent "totally mobilized." One wonders how it will be possible to make people believe that "after three years of war many Germans still enjoy their comforts undisturbed" (Göring); that they "have withdrawn into a false peace" (Goebbels); that the home front "has not supported the war with its last ounce of strength and in spite of the war retains a semblance of peace" (radio commentator Joachim Schieferdecker). The gentlemen who paint this distorted picture must have boundless trust in the tendency of people to think others much better off than themselves. However that may be; total mobilization can of course always be made a degree more total. It is only a question of how completely civilian activities are to be throttled. The new measures give the screw another big turn, as one can see plainly enough through the euphemistic veils of official phraseology. "Farewell must now be said to many amenities which have lent life the appearance of undisturbed peacefulness" (Herr Schieferdecker). "Many comforts which deluded us with a sense of being at peace will disappear, and there must be no further talk of them" (Goebbels).

What does the great step consist of? For the present only of a new registration. All men from sixteen to sixty-five and all women from seventeen to forty-five who are not working for the war must register. Later they will be compelled to take war jobs. The purpose, of course, is to sweep up the last bit of human chaff out of every crack and corner. Examination of the measure reveals that of more considerable reservoirs only two are expected to give results.

First, there are the remaining women. Although many million women are already in industry, agriculture, and the civil service, some are still housewives. These are doomed by the decree. Only women with a child under seven or with at least two under fourteen may continue to be merely housewives. All others must take war jobs. The second category is a more important one and comprises those against whom the decree was chiefly directed. These are the owners and employees of small businesses. Obviously the intention is to close every tiny industry

in the country—all those with one boss and at most five employees. It should be understood that all able-bodied employers and employees of such businesses have long since been in the armed services; only the old and the unfit are left in them. It is they who will now find themselves barred from their store or workshop. For the rest of the population life will be a great deal less comfortable in consequence; the tailor, the cobbler, the clock-maker, the optician, the grocer, the stationer, and the hotel-keeper had their function in society. From one to two million persons, however—most of them, it is true, of slight industrial value—can now be forced into war work.

Thus the people's upsurge amounts to sweeping up a few leavings. Strong pressure will undoubtedly be exerted, but the supply of workers has already been squeezed too dry to yield an appreciable number now. It is simply not true that "millions upon millions of unused energy units are waiting to be thrown into the tremendous war processes of our civil life" (Goebbels). One asks, therefore, why the Nazi leadership ever chose to sound the trumpets for these sorry sweepings as if they were giants going to war. It could just as well have sucked them in quietly, without any fuss, without even a new law. That would have seemed the natural thing to do inasmuch as the same propaganda continually emphasizes that Germany's foes, especially the Russians, are only ruining themselves by carrying mobilization so far. "Russia," said Göring on January 30, "is making this winter, for the last time, a colossal effort. It has now scraped the bottom of its masses of human material. I am convinced that this is the last levy that can be squeezed out; for such severity is no longer severity but barbarism." It is hardly consistent with these assertions to hail the total mobilization in Germany as a fabulous proof of strength and to say of it, "Though the enemy would like to construe it that way, it does not mean that we are at the end of our resources."

Nevertheless, it is easy to see why this relatively limited and rather alarming move was advertised so sensationally. If we wish to make a person believe that things will get better soon, we must be able to explain to him in a halfway rational manner how the change will be brought about. We must show him that certain factors at present inactive, will soon exert a controlling influence. In recent weeks the only factor of this kind that German propaganda could point to was the submarine war. Of this it was possible to say with some plausibility, "Just wait till the strangling effect of the sinkings begins to be felt." But no similar hope could be held out for the war on land. No good reason for expecting a great change in the way things were going could be discovered. It was necessary, therefore, to invent one, and this is it: "Only wait till our total mobilization gets in its effect. That will change everything."

File and Remember

De Gaullist Magic

WE WANTED unity. We always wanted unity and we want it today. We want to see all the French fighting in the same army, all the French Empire building a single war bloc. But the people of France do not want an equivocal situation. Europe, which has endured so much blood and suffering, does not want an equivocal situation. This people's war will not allow an equivocal situation.

It is not enough to tell Frenchmen: "Fight the war and afterward we shall see." Frenchmen want to be sure that while they are fighting the war, their fathers, their brothers, their mothers will not be put in concentration camps. Peyrouton does not offer them that guaranty. They want to be sure of their leaders. . . .

What they [the Allied leaders] want from us is that we make Vichy appear good. They think that when we approach a traitor he will become, simply through contact with us, loyal. They think that by this means Peyrouton will become an exemplary democratic administrator and the Marshal will again find his Verdun and become a real patriarchal popular leader until he reaches his hundredth year. They exaggerate our power of magic. We want unity of Frenchmen, but we are not ready to pay too high a price for artificial unity.—F. QUILICI in *La Marseillaise*, French underground newspaper.

A New Disraeli?

I wonder why there is an undercurrent of anti-American talk in certain right-wing circles? I hear it whispered and I see it said that, after all, Roosevelt is nearing the end of his record reign. The Republicans and the right-wing Democrats, they point out, are getting stronger.

The isolationists, they rightly say, feel confident enough to express themselves freely once again. It is not at all unlikely, they add, that when the war ends America will reject Rooseveltian idealism just as she rejected Wilson's policy. Therefore, don't bank too much on American cooperation after the war.

It is a very clever way of countering the effect of Roosevelt's speeches. And doubly suspicious because it comes from precisely those quarters which have been making excuses for the less "idealist" manifestations of United States State Department foreign policy in North Africa.

What with Roosevelt's "idealism" on the one hand and Russia's sky-high prestige on the other, some of the Tories are anxious about where *they* are to come in after the war.

Indicating how their minds are running is the latest "Review of World Affairs," published by the select Imperial Political Group. Discussing the respective merits of possible future Prime Ministers, it picks on two names: Eden and (would you believe it!) newly promoted W. S. Morrison.*

But the Imperial Policy Group, which also, on occasions,

* Mr. Morrison has for twenty years been considered a "coming man" by the right-wing Tories, but he has never managed to arrive. In the early days of the war he was Minister of Food, but when Britain began to feel the pinch of the U-boats he was relegated to the comparatively routine Postmaster Generalship. At present he is Minister of Town and Country Planning.

means the 1922 Committee, has no liking for Eden. It regards his rise to the position of natural heir to Conservative leadership as a sad business. There are "very many in the Conservative Party who deplore Mr. Eden's leadership," it says. Reason why?

Because he "gives the impression of standing for something approaching rationalist continentalism." I can only discover the meaning of this phrase by posing its opposite.

Opposite of continentalism in foreign policy is imperial isolationism. To "rationalist," the "Review" provides its own opposite . . . a "mystic patriotism" which is associated with the "Toryism of Mr. Morrison" and which possesses the additional advantage of being "suspicious of foreign political influence over English affairs."

Moreover, Mr. Morrison's Toryism is "radical." It is "the Toryism which has opposed vested interests" (*sic*) and "fought for the great reforms" and is *against* all forms of Continental regimentation. Regimentation is the Tory boggy word for planning.

The Tory formula therefore emerges: imperial isolationism *plus* mystic patriotism *plus* Tory radicalism *minus* socialism.—"SPARTACUS" in *Reynolds' News* (London).

Franco's Intentions

The connections between the Franco government and the Vichyites in North Africa are well known, and it is now being gradually admitted in British circles that the Iberian bloc, whose formation was at first presented as in effect a victory for the policy of Sir Samuel Hoare and a blow to Axis ambitions, is nothing of the kind.

I have seldom seen a reversal of attitude so complete as has occurred in London circles on this issue during the past couple of weeks. It seems pretty clear that the first information on the meaning of the Iberian bloc was based exclusively on information from Sir Samuel Hoare himself, and was of course used by the extreme right in Washington and London as a political weapon in support of the pro-Franco, pro-Vichy policy hitherto pursued.

Later, however, the true facts of the situation forced themselves into the open. . . . The Iberian bloc is recognized as being directed not against the Axis but, above all, against the possibility of a second front on the Iberian Peninsula in the event of a German "skeleton" occupation of Spain.—FRANK PITCAIRN in the *Daily Worker* (London).

Soldiers Must Speak

I am told that plans for demobilization are now under serious consideration, and that it is proposed to consult the defense forces, military and civilian, about the scheme. . . .

I hope the consultation will be real. A wise government would set out deliberately to build institutions through which the men and women involved can freely discuss and seriously influence the final proposals. I should like to see each battalion allowed to elect, grade by grade, a committee to consider the plans, and from such battalion committees there ought to be divisional and corps committees, again of all ranks, which would ultimately culminate in an advisory committee in Whitehall for each of the departments concerned.

—HAROLD LASKI in *Reynolds' News*.

BOOKS and the ARTS

The Vichy Men

VICHY: TWO YEARS OF DECEPTION. By Léon Marchal. The Macmillan Company. \$2.50.

THE interest of this solid and sober book does not lie on the surface. It contains few personal touches and few picturesque passages. The rare "inside stories" cannot be accepted as historical evidence, since their source is not divulged. What we find in these pages is the now familiar story—dismal, unadorned, unrelieved even by a burst of indignation. If it is passion you want, read "Français, Voici la Vérité!" by Henri de Kérillis. If you seek the significance of the contest within the French soul, go to Jacques Maritain. M. Marchal is an expert in trade and finance, and writes like one. This implies great assets, with a few liabilities.

But this quiet book is an honest, an intelligent document. Intended as a denunciation of Vichy, it helps us to understand why so many people accepted, at first, the Marshal and his nondescript "French State," and why our own diplomats find it so hard even now to purge their minds of the Vichy delusion. The regime was partly a "deception" in the English sense; it was perhaps even more *une déception* in the French meaning—a frustrated hope, a deepening disappointment.

Accepting Vichy was an almost instinctive misstep, like the leap that carried Lord Jim into the lifeboat. Once committed, all hope had to be left behind. Timidity disguised as punctilious loyalty, self-interest in the garb of sacrifice, senile flabbiness under the mask of stubborn pride prevented the men in power from acknowledging their original error. They had always considered themselves the *good* people, the social élite, the military experts, the born leaders, defrauded of their rights by the democratic mob. So they ascribed the catastrophe to the inefficiency and corruption of the Republic. Assured of their own rectitude, they could not admit that it was they, the fossils of the old war, who were responsible for the antiquated equipment and methods of the army; they who had sabotaged the alliances of France; they who had destroyed national unity by declaring, "Rather Hitler than Blum!" and by declining to form as in 1914 a genuine Sacred Union. They refused to see that in their eagerness to seize power they had to welcome defeat, to hope for the immediate downfall of England, to paralyze the resistance of the empire. No price was too high if only they could "strangle the old whore." It is their condemnation that their party interests coincided so exactly with the deepest humiliation of their country.

They dreamed of restoring an economy of yeomen and artisans under a paternal squirearchy. Vanity, of course; but not so foolish as the hope that they could, by accepting a heavy sacrifice, free themselves from their victors, as a trapped animal gnaws its leg free from the jaws of steel. They thought in terms of a vanished world. War was once a princely game; you lost a battle, you paid with a province, and you shook hands with your opponents. Hitler's aim was

not to defeat but to enslave and destroy. The armistice was not as in former wars the end of martyrdom, the first step toward recovery and liberation; it was the beginning of an ever-tightening servitude—from Rethondes to Montoire, from pseudo-collaboration to complete subjection. The Vichy men had bartered their souls for a show of power, and now even the last bauble is taken away from them.

The weakness of M. Marchal's book, as of most books about France, is that it presents Laval as the ideal, and therefore conventional, villain. Do not tempt me to put in a good word for him! The man himself is beneath contempt; the scathing indictment by Henri Torrès stands. His professed policy, however, reconciliation, collaboration, New Order, would be defensible—if Hitler were not Hitler. Hitler never wanted collaboration with France any more than with Poland. Laval may give as an alibi that the resistance of the French people, or Pétain's hopeless shilly-shallying, sabotaged his policy. But had the French been a nation of Lavals and groveled at Hitler's feet, they would not have been accepted as true collaborators. They would have been treated like so many Lavals, insulted, browbeaten, tossed aside. Yes, a new order is needed, a federal, fraternal Europe; but only when Hitler and his parasites have been destroyed.

M. Marchal, who knows this country well, alludes to our foreign policy with diplomatic reticence. But his verdict is plain. We worked for two years on the hypothesis that we had to appease Vichy so as to prevent the fleet and the empire from falling into Hitler's hands. But they were not within his reach. His only hope of keeping them neutral was to have them under the sway of the puppet regime at Vichy. Had that regime collapsed earlier, the fleet and the colonies would have been on our side.

"Thus," says M. Marchal, "a great price was paid for something that did not require buying. The maintenance of diplomatic relations between Washington and Vichy contributed to Marshal Pétain's government, especially in the period immediately following the armistice, an appearance of legality it needed in order to consolidate its authority and its prestige. Moreover, it was this prestige alone that caused the fleet and the colonies to remain faithful to Vichy." In other words, we sedulously played Hitler's game. Had Vichy not been recognized, France would not be rent asunder today any more than Norway is; and North Africa would not be infested with fascist-minded officials. We have much to atone for.

Laval's return to power, marking the utter dissolution of Pétain, his power and his legend, was a heaven-sent opportunity to break with Vichy. M. Marchal seized it. No one could have been more righteously vehement about "the Laval-Darlan clique" than Mr. Hull; Sumner Welles uttered words which should have meant an irreparable breach. But matters were patched up somehow. We kept recognizing Vichy while pouring scorn on the man whom Pétain had proclaimed his *alter ego*. It is passing strange.

Now we are told by the best possible authority that we

should put our trust in the infinite knowledge and wisdom of our diplomats. The facts, as recorded in this book, speak for themselves. I have been a student of history for well over forty years, and it is my belief that the final truth in these matters was spoken by Oxenstierna some three hundred years ago.

ALBERT GUÉRARD

The Measure of Man

SCULPTURE THROUGH THE AGES. By Lincoln Rothschild. Whittlesey House. \$5.

CURIOSLY—since it is perhaps the most heroic, emblematic, historically concentrated, and humanly dramatic of the arts—sculpture has been the most slighted by critics, the most scantied by general appreciation, of them all. Intelligent books on it are few, skilful interpreters fewer. For this the inferior social standing and declining practice of the art in the past three centuries are only partly accountable. ("Perhaps it has been a lost art in Europe generally," says Herbert Read, "for it is possible to argue that the whole Renaissance conception of sculpture was a false one.") Sculpture shares little of the pragmatic and political appeal of painting; it lends itself far less to literary and moral exploitation; it is as inaccessible to popular use as it is intractable to craftsmen; it has elicited a comparatively meager tradition of critical analysis and thought. Rebellious in its discipline, it may repel where painting flatters or enchants. Self-betrayed when it compromises with pictorial or homiletic uses, it reproves the vulgarizer or the eclectic, and recedes stubbornly to its own standard of isolated freedom and integrity. Having lost its old alliance with architecture, it has usually failed in its later treaties with social utility and decoration. When, descending from principle through the facility of clay or lesser mediums, it finds its identity imperiled, it recoils to the stone's intransigence, discouraging the experimentation that would enlarge its scope and attraction.

Statuaire, repousse
L'argile que pétrit
Le pouce
Quand flotte ailleurs l'esprit.

Sculpture is jealous of the authority and rigor that have made it, with music, the most independent and absolute of arts—one whose law and nature provide a standard to which more intuitive, impressionable, and humane modes of expression perpetually recur. When Valéry made his aphorism on the "indecisiveness" of painting, he implied an authority in sculpture which no repudiation or skepticism of its discipline—not even Leonardo's scorn of its *arte meccanicissima*—has shaken.

The recent output of large art books, stimulated to the point of much indiscriminate editing and sales promotion by the example of the Phaidon editions, had not yet provided a general survey of sculpture, and Mr. Rothschild here essays to fill the gap. His book is the first conspectus of its subject since A. M. Rindge's "Sculpture" of 1929. (The studies of Maryon, Wilenski, Post, Eric Gill, Sirén, and Rhys Carpenter are critically, historically, or academically specialized; the average guide for laymen rests at the effusively sentimental level of Lorado Taft's popular volume of a quarter-century

ago.) Miss Rindge's book suffered from an immature sketchiness of composition, a vexatious set of postage stamp-size plates, a defeatingly high-toned exertion in matters of style and taste, and a consequent stage fright in its expository and speculative efforts. It was, however, critically serious, had a sharp sense of plastic and formal conditions, was informed on theory, and proposed if it did not settle the problems of the sculptor's mediums, their evolution through cultures and technical resources, and the status of sculpture in modern art. One would like to see the book revised under the advantages of its author's matured abilities.

There is nothing high-toned or specialized about Mr. Rothschild's expansive approach to his task. Giving short shrift to the rigors and selectivity of aesthetic method, he aims to balance the social and economic values of sculpture against its formal and stylistic development through the major periods of culture. His chapter headings are indicative: Egypt: Why Change?; Greece and Rome: Man's Image; Romanesque: Heaven on Earth; French Renaissance, Rococo, and Neoclassicism: The Gilded Cage, etc. These catchpenny accents—deriving from Thomas Craven?—recur throughout his preface, chapters, and program notes. The reader is advised to have no fear of encountering "the terminology and petty vanities of cultural writing." Analysis has been kept "as simple, obvious, and untechnical as possible." "Human meaning" is set above "formal qualities." Excesses of religious purpose, visionary individualism, social artifice, and abstraction are held under peremptory suspicion and reproof. Connoisseurship is scouted as a prevailing evil from the Renaissance downward. Humanistic and economic values are justified against creative specialization, extra-social purposes, and "the fallacies of rationalization." A general air of no-nonsense realism prevails. All this is to the good in rescuing the vitality, historical meaning, and practical conditions of sculpture from airless academic or aesthetic confinement. Mr. Rothschild has a vigorous, almost physical, enthusiasm for his subject, has steeped himself in its liveliest appeals, sketches boldly and skilfully, often dramatizes his facts with striking effect and emphasis, and writes, though without style, with zest and honesty. Whether he popularizes intelligently or not is another question.

The test of value in any survey is the degree to which it makes a critical continuity of its facts, finds the terms to qualify and evaluate them, clarifies by comparison, shows derivations and relations without falsifying or blunting differences, and so carries the reader through to an illumination not only of history but of values and of sensibility. Mr. Rothschild's results on these scores are rough and in the end fairly elusive. He is sound in his handling of facts—if at times pardonably elementary; but his vividness has its complement in superficiality, his skepticism in impatience, his dramatic sense in verbal insensitiveness, his humanism in a shortness of sympathy with aesthetic values and processes that often arrives at grossness and facile sensationalism. Ideas or motives of formal purity and autonomy are thus brought through to little soundness of definition in his expositions. The fear of aesthetic independence entails a sacrifice of any consistent sense of essential creative purposes and methods. The suspicion of spiritual provincialism induces—as so often in recent books on art or literature—a correspond-

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ing fear and incomprehension of the artist's special integrity and personality. If space permitted, examples of these hindrances might be quoted from his treatment of Greek styles, of Michelangelo, of the varying orders of Gothic, of the exaggerated claims advanced for African art, of the problems of twentieth-century work, here greatly minimized and scanted. All of which means that the ideal simplification demanded by a short survey of an immense field has not been found and that the book must be read, if seriously, with continuous reservations of the sort we have come to find indissociable from the excessively humanistic and social approach to art in our time.

But it must be added that on the level of this approach the volume is more a stimulus to active appreciation than to dissent, and that it gives admirable value for its cost. Its 123 large plates are richly varied, its examples well and unconventionally chosen, its photographs as good as any miscellany of plates uncontrolled by ideal conditions of lighting and arrangement could arrive at, and their reproduction excellent. I know of no finer compact anthology in its field. Familiar monuments spring out with fresh appeal and suggestion. The panorama of sculpture expands with the full force of its prodigies and marvels: the superbly sophisticated rhythmic vitality of the Egyptian steles and reliefs, the inexhaustible imagery of Greece, the overwhelming beauty of the Ludovisi Throne, the dynamic historiation of the Romanesque capitals, the breath-taking syntheses of the Gothic tympani, the lavish yet integrated invention of Tilman Riemenschneider and its baroque counterpart in Bernini, the spiritual and psychic intensity that nerves the monumentality of Michelangelo, the psychic penetration of Donatello, the modern appeal—connecting not only with Rodin but with Maillol, Meunier, and Moore—of the Uffizi "Arrotino," the ripe charm of Houdon, the redeeming coherence of passion in Rodin. In the presence of all this one may easily be compelled to the belief that sculpture is supreme and central among the mediums of art; that all else pales by comparison with its force and unity; that every other plastic order must appeal to its morality, eloquence, and integrity; and that—before the claims of more spontaneous, freely creative, treacherous, yet more comprehensive and exploring mediums reassert themselves—all other expression is by comparison a path of peril and a concession to time's corruptions:

Lutte avec le carrare,
Avec le paros dur
Et rare,
Gardiens du contour pur;

Emprunte à Syracuse
Son bronze où fermement
S'accuse
Le trait fier et charmant.

Tout passe. — L'art robuste
Seul a l'éternité.

Sculpture is a measure and glory of our humanity; it may also be its humiliation. It declares its supremacy when it defines and limits that humanity most severely. Yet there its supremacy also lapses, and the other languages of man enter to voice his imperfection, his scope of mind and spirit, his capacities for a larger hope and mystery. Without sculpture

these languages would lack what is conceivably the severest preceptor and example they have ever known—an absolute of probity that drives them to scale, beyond it, their own summits of desire, vision, and revelation.

MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL

Sir Stafford

CRIPPS: ADVOCATE EXTRAORDINARY. By Patricia Strauss. Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. \$3.

WHEN Sir Stafford Cripps entered the Churchill government, there were many who believed that the progressive cause would gain thereby. To this reviewer it was rather a pathetic belief, for it seemed even then that Sir Stafford was falling for a characteristic conservative maneuver. "The devil was sick, the devil a monk would be." The British Conservatives, lacking the sustenance of military victories, confronted at home and abroad by formidable problems, were ready to admit Sir Stafford, around whom a dangerously large body of protesting opinion was gathering, and later they were willing to send him upon the most difficult of all missions. If he succeeded, then his success would redound to the credit of the government and not of the opposition. If he went too far in his idealism or in his enthusiasm, then it would be easy to check or overthrow him when the inevitable victories came. Probably Mrs. Strauss would not describe what has befallen Sir Stafford in such simple terms. There is enough material in her extremely valuable book to support the intransigent view of Tory Machiavellianism.

How did Cripps come to fall for such a maneuver? Or, if one takes a kindly view of the matter, how did he ever persuade himself that a government headed by that arch anti-India man, Mr. Churchill, would let him solve the problem? This reviewer, despite all that Norman Angell and Kingsley Martin have written, believes that Louis Fischer made his point in *The Nation* that Sir Stafford actually offered what Congress leaders have repeatedly declared he did. If this is so, it was surely something in the nature of egotism on Sir Stafford's part to believe he could bilk the Tory machine. If, on the other hand, Sir Stafford offered no more than his secretary declares he did, then it was a strange self-contradiction that allowed him to make that unacceptable offer.

Mrs. Strauss does not confront this problem as squarely as she ought. We have a right to a much more serious analysis of his character than she has given. The fact is that Sir Stafford, for all his apparent clarity of spirit and logical rigor, is a difficult man to understand.

Together with his steadily burning idealism, political inconsistencies and weaknesses have been apparent all through his short career. He so much distrusted the Baldwin government that when the Labor Party announced that it would support sanctions against Italy, Sir Stafford resigned from the National Executive Committee of the party, and with respect to this incident Mrs. Strauss quotes him thus: "To me the central factor in our decision must turn not so much upon what we as a country should or should not do but upon who is in control of our actions." A quite orthodox

idea is contained in these words. Had Sir Stafford posed the question of Indian freedom thus in 1942, would he have gone to India? Yet even in that earlier crisis Sir Stafford was not consistent, for he thought the League of Nations would have been justified in declaring war on Japan over the Sino-Japanese dispute.

"Cripps's tendency to overstress his personal role in public events is heightened by his own unusual history of leadership," Mrs. Strauss says. That tendency, at times amounting to something like arrogance, has been noted by others. It was not the cause of his acceptance of the Indian mission of course, though in other matters his "unusual history of leadership" probably does explain his political naivete. For in the upshot Sir Stafford has shown himself repeatedly to be as politically naive as a child. The British public, Mrs. Strauss thinks, wants him to be that way. Naivete is somehow considered a proof of idealism. Cripps's naivete, however, does not spring from his unquestionable sincerity but from two other things—his sheer inexperience and, oddly enough, his legalistic outlook. This latter Mrs. Strauss herself recognizes. Sir Stafford has never gone through the arduous school of party work; he believes a logical argument, however restricted its base, must necessarily win over opponents. Take, for instance, his expulsion from the Labor Party, described in detail in this book. Cripps's political good sense told him that a popular front was necessary if Chamberlain was to be driven from office. His professional training told him that the Labor Party constitution permitted him to agitate for the front until a convention had decided the issue. Sir Stafford's legal opinion was doubtless correct, but it was an excessive innocence to suppose that the party bosses would take a legal view of the matter. It was a proof of sheer inexperience in him to persist to the point of expulsion before a convention had decided to reject popular fronts. Again, how completely he misunderstood the moment, when, already expelled, he was allowed to address the 1939 convention of the Labor Party! In place of delivering a hard-driving political appeal on the great issue, he read to a profoundly anxious membership a lawyer's opinion of his own case. There is Sir Stafford's weakness. His own beliefs rest quite firmly upon cold logic. Logic is more important to him than feeling. Therefore he misjudges both men and history. In 1942 he must have supposed that the British imperialists would surrender on India rather than lose the war. He did not understand that for the imperialists to lose the empire is to lose the war.

Has Sir Stafford a great political future? We all hope that he has, but on the strength of this book it is to be doubted. He is still a symbol of aspiration, still the only real figure to express the deep and aching hope of the British masses. So much Mrs. Strauss compels one to believe, but he is a man without party in an age where effective action is impossible without party. Mrs. Strauss, whose book constantly illuminates wide areas of British political life in a way that should make her American readers deeply grateful to her, should at once write a long personal appeal to Sir Stafford. She might be able to convince him that he must get back into the party at once. A one-man party, even if millions admire that man, cannot save Britain from the Tories.

RALPH BATES

Mann Speaks to Germany

LISTEN, GERMANY! By Thomas Mann. Alfred A. Knopf. \$1.50.

THE recent publication of Mann's "Order of the Day" has given us the opportunity to understand and appreciate his political thought. His new volume, embodying his radio addresses to Germany, is not therefore of special significance. The addresses convey the eloquent scorn of a great humanist for the Nazis and all their works. But this attitude of contempt pervades the addresses with a consistency which may prompt boredom. Even the most appreciative reader may also become slightly impatient with the author's rather frequent references to his own part in the struggle between the German humanist tradition and Nazism.

One wonders how effective as propaganda these addresses really were. Though he tries to appeal to what is best in German nature against its Nazi corruption, Dr. Mann frequently allows himself to taunt the German people for their political ineptness and docility. His taunts may be justified, but that does not make them helpful to a people facing such desperate alternatives.

Furthermore, Dr. Mann is frequently naive in his grasp of political realities. Sometimes he assures the Germans that "if you are defeated the vindictiveness of the whole world will break loose against you." Since Dr. Goebbels strikes the same note, one may question its value as propaganda against Nazism. At other times the Germans are reassured and are told that Hitler's threat "that they are to be annihilated if they fail to win this war" is a "gross lie" and that "Hitler and his gang are the only obstacles to a just peace." The tragic realities of history may conform neither to the threat nor to the reassurance. There are undoubtedly millions of anti-Nazis in Germany whose hearts are torn when they contemplate the consequences of German defeat. The most stout-hearted among them still find defeat preferable to victory and continued enslavement. But it is idle to regard this choice as an easy one, or to deny the reality of the dilemma in which they find themselves.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Swamp-Grass Roots

DUST TRACKS ON THE ROAD. By Zora Neale Hurston. J. B. Lippincott. \$3.

THE first half of this book makes delightful reading. Zora Neale Hurston's childhood in the all-Negro village of Eatonville, Florida, contains more tall tales than you have believed since you were six, and the chances are that you did not believe them then. But you will believe these, even the visions which she had as a child foretelling the dark episodes through which she was to pass, and which were all fulfilled in the order in which they had appeared to her. You will believe that she really did try to kill her step-mother when she was thirteen, and came very near to doing it. Most wonderful of all, you will believe that there really was such a community as Eatonville, where little Zora heard stories in the grocery store which would be shocking in the toughest poolroom, and where the most intimate and unprintable details of the neighbors' lives were discussed over

A. Knopf.

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Hurston.

reading, to village you have that you see, even the dark were all to her. Her step to doing are really heard in the and un- sed over

the back fence or even on the front porch. In short, a community where nothing could surprise you except an inhibition.

One passes on to the success story of the Negro waif who managed to win an education, the esteem and patronage of Franz Boas, a fellowship for anthropological research, and eventually some fame and security as an author. But adventure still dogged Miss Hurston's footsteps. In the course of her research work in the field of Negro folklore she discovered the native songs and dances of the Haitian Negroes, and organized a concert troupe to bring them to Broadway. Her investigations took her back to the stranger-than-fiction world from which she had come, and a violent episode there nearly cost her her life. And for good measure she throws in the story of an African-born Negro who was brought to America in 1859 in the last slave ship to disgorge its fateful cargo on these shores.

If Miss Hurston had only stuck to telling stories, this book would be pure gold. Unfortunately she found it necessary to tack on a few chapters on love, religion, and race. Her remarks on the race problem are soured by the resentment of the rampant individualist who dislikes being identified with any group whatever. Her shoulder-shrugging cynicism contrasts forcibly with the realism of her master Boas, who acknowledged his own race as a cultural entity even though he knew as an anthropologist that the biological basis of racial differences was far too flimsy a foundation to support such a huge superstructure. But then a giant has no need to protect his individuality!

However, Miss Hurston's story should not be read for its direct contribution to the race problem, though its torrent of anecdote is undeniably revealing. It should rather be savored as first-rate narration, spiced with a rare talent for phrase.

BETSY HUTCHISON

Fiction in Review

IN THE interest of good neighborliness it would be pleasant to concur in the publishers' opinion that Erico Verissimo, author of "Crossroads" (Macmillan, \$2.75), is the Brazilian Dreiser, just as in the interest of quiet sincerity it would be pleasant to notice, for more than its effort, Jonreed Lauritzen's "Arrows into the Sun" (Knopf, \$2.50). But in any language Mr. Verissimo is closer to the Elmer Rice of "Street Scene" than he is to the author of "An American Tragedy," and as for Mr. Lauritzen's story of a half-breed Navajo, although it is decent and earnest, it is dull. Also dull and earnest, but not at all decent, is a novel called "Memo to a Firing Squad" by Frederick Hazlitt Brennan (Knopf, \$2.50). A thriller with a message, it revolves around a sell-out peace conference held in Lisbon, and its action is an account of how the machinations of the appeasers are circumvented by the local underground. It is a muddled, pretentious, and vulgar book, to be noticed, in fact, only for its indecency.

It appears that Mr. Brennan is one of those "wise," disillusioned, and tough descendants of Hemingway who are doubtless rather embarrassing to Hemingway himself. An ex-newspaperman turned political brooder, he is another of our popular authors (*Collier's*, the *Saturday Evening Post*,



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Red Book, Cosmopolitan) for whom the typewriter bell tolls. He may be writing only a thriller, but he has a serious purpose: he must warn us against a negotiated peace. He also has a serious hobby: the study of comparative methods of killing. This is a typical passage of dialogue:

"One should be judged on how he hates—on that alone," Dutch said.

"It is no time for watery guts."

"Or for laughter."

"Liberalism got us into this."

"They and the pacifists."

"A liberal is worse. I have heard such a one make excuses for Judas."

"They said 'Live and let live'—of Germans, they said it!"

"They talked—blah, blah, blah—while the Germans built tanks and bombers."

This is not an isolated passage; it is a fair example of any page in the book turned to at random. The speakers are members of Mr. Brennan's underground. These are the people who are going to save us from the evils of Nazism. Each is fanatically devoted to murder, and in Mr. Brennan's world murder becomes a fine art. So whether you line yourself up with Spigo, Mr. Brennan's blood-drunk refugee from Franco, with Dutch, his blood-drunk refugee from Holland, with Jules, the French chef who is leader of the movement, or with Karen, the heroine and blood-drunk refugee from Poland, you can have your choice of dagger, pistol, strangling with the bare hands, or strangling with the garrote. Killing is not only the whole of Mr. Brennan's plot; it is

the whole of his political philosophy, whatever the embroidery.

One would like to dismiss such books by simply calling them "corny," "corny" being one of Mr. Brennan's own favorite words. Surely if there is anything cornier than a newspaperman being virtuous about love, it is a newspaperman being "realistic" about political morality. But I'm afraid that sentiments like Mr. Brennan's find too much support among presumably decent people, these days, to be dismissed with a laugh. For instance, reviewing "Memo to a Firing Squad" in the *New York Times* of Sunday, January 31, William du Bois says of Mr. Brennan's "colorful characters": "And yet they carry out all these tasks [their killings] with such nonchalance that one's heart warms to them. . . ."

Whose heart, and what's going on here? In war—and we are at war—you kill because you have to, because that is your job, but it has never been my impression that you kill with nonchalance. Or perhaps Mr. du Bois means not nonchalance so much as finesse: certainly Mr. Brennan has a Hemingway-like interest in the techniques of death. But at least in the way of literature, it is a far cry from "Death in the Afternoon" to the day when the author of every third-rate book for the rental libraries has to boast a degree from the best-methods-of-finishing-them-up school.

Hemingway is a good writer; false notions may be started by good writers, they are turned into folk myths by bad writers. Thus Hemingway—again—created the male hero so superlatively manly that he has to go around killing bulls or socking people in the nearest bistro in order to confirm his virility. Mr. Brennan picks up this unhealthy confusion of manliness with brutality and assures us that the sexual prowess of Jules, his leader of the underground, is quite all that might be expected of such a prodigious killer; in the words of Reba, his wife, Jules is "much man, much man." But if the first object of manliness is woman, women might perhaps be allowed to speak for themselves on the subject of their heroes, instead of through the mouths of their male authors? I have yet to see the novel by a woman that supports this foolish and dangerous notion of masculinity.

And it seems to me—as I expect it does to most Americans—that one of the reasons we are at war is because the Nazis find slaughter so heart-warming. Yet ironically enough, at the same time that we are fighting to outlaw the murder and violence that are synonymous with Nazism, we are busy creating a literature that glorifies murder and violence. Evidently we can leave it to our writers to be the first to stumble blindly into the grave named for them by Huey Long when he said that in this country we'd call fascism anti-fascism.

To return to quiet and decency, however, Helen Howe has written a first novel called "The Whole Heart" (Simon and Schuster, \$2.50). Concerned with the moral-emotional struggles of a writer, it has the same theme as "Circle in the Water" by Helen Hull, published a few weeks ago, but it is infinitely the better book—cleaner, firmer, more perceptive. Indeed, having made the comparison, I withdraw it immediately in favor of a comparison with "The Late George Apley," to which it bears a more flattering resemblance. For like Mr. Marquand's novel, Miss Howe's story is in large part a study in Boston conscience, the kind that is more protection and self-delusion than duty.

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Of the two writers, Mr. Marquand may have the sharper eye and intelligence, but Miss Howe, in her non-literary life a monologist, has the sharper ear. By a device tailored in heaven for a monologist turned novelist, the hero of "The Whole Heart" is shown to us only through the diaries and letters of the four women who love him, and this, in fact, is the most interesting thing about Miss Howe's book—its proof of just how much, and then how little, can be told by inflection, by rhythm of speech, by what is really no more than dialogue. For in "The Whole Heart," as in most writing for the contemporary stage, what you eventually feel is that either the author should have used more intelligent and articulate characters to speak for her, or she should herself be a poet, in order to give another dimension to simple speech.

DIANA TRILLING

Pioneer and Philistine

AMERICAN PIONEER ARTS AND ARTISTS. By Carl W. Drepperd. Foreword by Rockwell Kent. The Pond-Ekberg Company. \$4.75.

BETWEEN 1750 and 1850 there was much amateur, professional, and semi-professional activity in this country in the figurative arts. A surprising quantity of paintings, miniatures, drawings, carvings, castings, stencil-work, and sundry decoration and ornament has been uncovered lately. Mr. Drepperd rightly objects to "primitive" as an inclusive term for all this work, the quality of which varies so much. He would prefer "pioneer." "Pioneer" is all right as a historical denominator, but it is valueless as a generic one, and rather inaccurate too. Most of the art which Mr. Drepperd calls pioneer was made in places already settled for generations. But then Mr. Drepperd claims that everything good about this country is the work of the "pioneering mind"—time-saving, railroads, and the popularity of tomatoes. But just what in this early American art distinguishes it as pioneer by contrast to similar work done in Europe at the same time? He does not say. As a matter of fact, Mr. Drepperd could have showed—but he would have had to think, and multiply distinctions—that a certain amount of American applied art is specifically pioneer in that its workmanship and conception were conditioned by its remoteness from places where the professional division of labor obtained.

Mr. Drepperd himself is a kind of primitive in art history. He inveighs against the "twaddle" of theory and appreciation and assures us that to understand and enjoy pioneer art it is only necessary to come to it with a full heart and empty mind. Writing in that homespun style which consists in stepping up close and shouting confidentially in your ear, sometimes he is almost illiterate. It is the price he has to pay for avoiding highfaluting flapdoodle. And because he has no theory he cannot organize his material. His book does contain, however, a lot of facts, names, dates, and reproductions.

It is startling to find Comrade Rockwell Kent writing the foreword to a book in which you read that "American pioneer art has nothing in common with such aberrations as cubism, surrealism, and kindred expressions . . . which derive from decadent strains of European and Near East peoples."

CLEMENT GREENBERG

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IN BRIEF

MATHEMATICAL RECREATIONS.

By Maurice Kraitchik. W. W. Norton and Company. \$3.75.

This is a revised edition in English of the same author's "La Mathématique des Jeux" published some years ago. Part of it is devoted to a popular discussion of the laws of chance as they affect various games, the rest to a great variety of problems and puzzles involving mathematical reasoning but mostly outside the routine processes taught in academic courses. For the enjoyment of most of it no great acquaintance with formal mathematics is required, but some gift for mathematical reasoning is. In fact, it might serve as a very useful supplement to the various books now popular which sometimes tend to give the reader a false idea of his competence by dealing in generalities and not requiring him to perform many mathematical operations.

THE LINCOLN LYRICS. By John Malcolm Brinnin. New Directions. \$1.

Mr. Brinnin, who appears to be establishing himself as one of the most competent of the younger poets, does nothing to detract from or to contribute to such a judgment in this collection of thirty-six lyrics. It is perfectly apparent that he has a natural gift for versification, a natural eye for the image, and a natural interest in everything around and about him. This cycle of lyrics on the life and times of Lincoln does its best to erect a kind of Lincolnian symbology; it fails largely because Mr. Brinnin declines to recognize the processes that elevate the image into the symbol. Nevertheless, several of these poems have a dignity and a simplicity that are noticeably absent from the work of too many young poets. Mr. Brinnin, like the one-eyed cripple in the country of the blind, has certain advantages: he seems to be a potential poet.

Art Note

FROM PARIS TO THE SEA DOWN

THE RIVER SEINE. Landscape Painting, French and some English.

At Wildenstein's, until February 27.

The course of the Seine as illustrated by some of the greatest painters of the nineteenth century. This is a magnificent show, containing an unbelievable russet and orange landscape by Renoir,

"Argenteuil," Bonington's view of the Tuileries, and masterpieces, too numerous to take in on one visit, by Sisley, Boudin, Corot, Monet, and Seurat. But why is Corot the only one of the Barbizon School to be represented? Did they never stir outside their forest, or is it that their stock has fallen too low?

C. G.

DRAMA

The Russian Front

THE Russo-German war is being fought again, this time on the stage of the Windsor Theater and in a play called "Counterattack." The program calls it "a drama by Janet and Philip Stevenson based on a Russian play by Ilya Vershinin and Mikhail Ruderman," but just what that means I have no way of knowing, and I suspect that neither the Russian nor the American contribution to the evening is as important as the fact that Margaret Webster directs the piece and that Morris Carnovsky acts the part of the hero. Mr. Carnovsky lends impressiveness and humanity to a role which does not seem to be written with much distinction, and the very theater-wise Miss Webster manages to impart, intermittently at least, a good deal of suspense to proceedings that otherwise would probably seem dragged out to intolerable length.

A few weeks ago I complained mildly that "The Russian People," the Theater Guild's version of the war, tried to get almost too much of everything into one play. "Counterattack" goes to the other extreme by making one scene and a single not very complicated incident serve as the basis for a whole evening. As the curtain goes up, a group of Nazi soldiers are taking refuge from the barrage outside in the bowels of a stone cellar. A few minutes after that they are taken prisoner by a group of Russians, who leave two men in charge. Only a few seconds later a bomb closes the one exit, and the play concerns itself with the trapped men, who spend something like thirty-six hours together before they are finally dug out, a few minutes before the final curtain falls, by a party which the audience knows is going to turn out to be Russian but which the trapped men think may be German. This, no doubt, sounds mildly ingenious, but nothing very unexpected is done with the situation. There are a few moments near the beginning when it rather looks as though the thing were

about to turn into an allegory with the two groups trapped in an underground version of the desert island practicing as well as discussing their respective philosophies and finally proving to everybody's satisfaction that communism is better. But little is made of this; it soon seems to have been forgotten; and the play settles down into a melodrama wherein the numerically superior Nazis try various dodges in an effort to catch their captors off guard and, whenever a little excitement is needed, almost succeed in getting hold of a gun or putting out the light. On the whole, and as I previously suggested, there is rather more suspense than this outline would suggest. In fact, there is frequently a good deal of suspense of a fairly elementary theatrical sort. But even the best playing and the best directing cannot make of the material so very much more than what it is in itself—rather conventionally contrived melodrama. To those who would like to see a melodrama with a Russian setting the play can be recommended. Upon those who would rather not see another war play unless it is quite a bit better than the other war plays, "Counterattack" had better not be urged very strongly.

Sidney Kingsley is a playwright with a conspicuous gift for "good theater" of a different sort. He likes to start with an idea rather than a situation, with something which suggests a thesis play, and then to build around it a sturdyactable piece in which intellectuals may discover some lack but in which the general theatergoing public finds something which it likes very much—namely, a message conveyed in simple dramatic terms. This is exactly what he has done again in "The Patriots," the play about Jefferson and Hamilton which now shows signs of turning into a real hit at the National Theater. It is, quite frankly, a tract for the times. The two protagonists are made to stand, respectively, for the democratic and the tory temperaments as well as for the democratic and tory philosophies. The action centers, first, around the controversy over the redemption of paper money, second, around the election of Jefferson, and it is everywhere made abundantly clear that the author expects us to be thinking quite as much about current events as about history, since he assumes a very close parallel—namely, the existence of the same struggle between those who trust the people and those who, because they do not, want to put on the brakes and to nullify as far as

possible the results of popular action. Opposition critics—and it is no doubt inevitable that even drama criticism should now be tending to become pro or anti-Administration—grumble that to them Hamilton, the believer in centralized authority, looks more like Mr. Roosevelt than Jefferson does; but I do not think that Mr. Kingsley intended any personal identification. He merely wants to insist that the struggle between tory ideas and democratic ideas has again arisen in connection with a new crisis and that he is on the side Jefferson was on. The fact that I agree with him may have something to do with it, but I found the play both interesting as argument and quite unexpectedly vivid and entertaining as theater.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

MUSIC

EACH time I hear Mozart's "Marriage of Figaro" after an interval I am struck all over again by its marvels—the ones I had remembered, the ones I had forgotten, the ones I had not noticed before. Recently I played the Glyndebourne recording again; and this time, as I listened with new delight to details of the vocal line that made the points of the text with such ease and such force, I was struck as never before by the activity of the orchestra. From what is said on the subject you may have the idea that expressive orchestral comment in opera was born with Wagner; if you have, just listen to the orchestra in "Figaro": listen to it, for one thing in that unique marvel, the Overture; listen, of course, to the running fire of gay, mocking, witty comment that it keeps up in the great ensembles like the "Cosa sento" trio of Act 1, the finale of Act 2; and listen also to such miraculous details as the change in harmony embodied in the sustained chords of the few winds with poignant figures in violins just before the words *parlo d'amor vegliando* and again before *parlo d'amor sognando* in Cherubino's aria "Non so più cosa son."

Shortly afterward I attended a performance of the work at the Metropolitan. The audience seemed to enjoy the music that was sung, and to be vastly amused by the things that happened on the stage; but the humor in the figurations of violins or woodwinds didn't get a chuckle. True, the audience wasn't listening for them; but even if it had been it would have found them difficult to hear; for on the scale on which

they were produced from the orchestra by Bruno Walter they were almost inaudible in the huge auditorium. In a smaller place it would have been an excellently conducted performance; it was also well-staged, well-acted, and for the most part well-sung. Pinza's superb Figaro was an old story, as was Brownlee's adequate but unimpressive Count. New to me was the Countess of Eleanor Steber, who brought to the part a fine stage presence and a voice that is fresh, agreeable, and used with good musical taste; new also was the Susanna of Bidu Sayao, whose singing was admirable though her voice is small for the Metropolitan's vast space, and who would be an even more effective Susanna if she could get herself to put her hands on her hips only half as many times as she does; and new, finally, was the Cherubino of Risë Stevens, who acted the part quite well though without the charm of Novotna, but who expressed emotion in her singing not by suitable inflection of phrase but by huge gulps and gasps and wrenchings of her voice away from the ends of the phrases.

The Metropolitan performance of Verdi's "Forza del Destino" that I heard over the air was transmitted by the engineers with faulty balance between solo voices and orchestra—with the voices, that is, made to sound very near and loud while the orchestra sounded distant and not sufficiently strong or clear. It seemed to me, despite its lack of physical volume, that the orchestra's playing under Walter's direction was powerful in style; on the other hand, disregarding the volume which the voices acquired through electrical amplification, I found that Stella Roman was singing with more ease, more fullness and beauty of voice, and less tremolo than when I heard her a couple of years ago, that Tibbett was driving a voice which already was hoarsely threadbare, and that Jagel's brassy bleat was something which should not be heard in Verdi's music.

The quiz and the victory rally in the intermissions left the announcer only enough time for the bare outline of the story of the opera; and this I found to be an inadequate guide through the long stretches of dialogue and action. Those who argue for opera in English as the way to interest the public are wrong about the English but right in their contention that the listener must know what the opera is about. In the opera house the intermissions provide time for him to find out by reading a libretto;

and the time they provide could be used by the announcer to read passages of the text to the radio listeners. Better still would be the publication and distribution of cheap librettos that would make it possible for these listeners to follow every word and action. I believe the British Broadcasting Corporation does this; and two or three years ago a project for a new series of librettos with new and good English translations was brought to N. B. C. The man who acted as intermediary got as far as N. B. C.'s musical counsel, Samuel Chotzinoff, and was disposed of with a couple of characteristic sneers—the question what the man expected to get out of the project for himself, and the comment that the suggestion had already been made forty times before. It got no further at N. B. C.; but it was a good suggestion all forty-one times; and perhaps the Metropolitan Opera Guild will see that and act on it.

Relevant to the use of the intermissions for quizzes and operatic gossip columns is a passage I happen to have read only the other day in an article by Roger Sessions in "Modern Music": "Musical life today is theory-ridden and musicology-ridden. The radio and the publishing houses swarm with well-intentioned words about music, and the attitude of the music-lover is more and more replaced in our musical life by that of the musical student. Everything possible is done to deter the layman from listening to Bach's work spontaneously as the glorious and timeless music that it is; instead, he is never allowed to forget Bach's exact historical position, the number of his wives and children . . . his place in the society of his time, or a thousand interesting but—as far as the essential impact of his music is concerned—irrelevant and even disturbing particulars." The tendency produced an absurd episode years ago, when the New York Philharmonic-Symphony, to economize, stopped issuing Lawrence Gilman's program-notes, and Mr. Downes proceeded to make a commotion from which one gathered that there was no point in a concert at which all that happened was that an orchestra played music. As for broadcasting, it is run by people with no real interest in music themselves, who therefore cannot believe it interests anyone else. What they believe in is the prestige-value of names like "Toscanini" and "Metropolitan Opera"; and even then they think they must use quizzes and gossip columns to get people to listen.

B. H. HAGGIN

Letters to the Editors

Letter from Paris

[The author of the following letter from Paris, written at the end of October, is a young French university student whose husband left France to continue the struggle against the enemy. She is active in the underground movement in Paris. Her letter did not pass through the hands of the Nazi or Vichy censors.]

The letter you sent me through the regular channels was literally cut to pieces by the censor. I am grateful to him none the less for the care with which he cut out the "dangerous" passages in such a way as to leave the inoffensive lines intact. He even pasted in some of the loose pieces. I find that quite touching even though there isn't much left of the letter. Freedom of speech, as you understand it, exists only inside your happy country. As for us, I think we shall soon forget the uses of speech.

Your letter, which came across the demarcation line in the pocket of a tramp, raised my spirits not so much by its contents as by the feeling it communicated of a life different from ours. I realize that somewhere there are living active forces, people who breathe freely, people who think—a real life, that!

I should like to say there is "nothing new." Unhappily that is not the case. You are probably familiar with the situation. It goes badly, and immediate prospects grow darker and darker. You must know, surely, that thousands and thousands of people have been arrested, deported, executed. The "resisters" are tracked down by our Nazi masters and their "valets de Vichy."

Our turn will come soon. There's no doubt of that. Personally, I am very calm because I have the rare privilege of being all alone in Paris, and one never worries much about oneself. I am absolutely cool, at least now. Perhaps when the decisive moment comes I shall be less steady because physically I am very little prepared for that type of adventure—I who can't sleep when my neighbor snores, who stifles in a room when the windows are closed. Morally I am ready for anything, and nothing can take me unawares.

The Parisians are stirring—and awaiting a "miracle." But I have not

yet lost my sense of reality. All this business, despite the immense human distress it represents, is only a small link in the history we are living through. Naturally human misery seen at such close range and in its most poignant aspects cannot but affect me. But I do not attach to this problem more importance than it merits. I tell myself that after all there is truly no reason why I should escape all the risks. It is not fatalism, but I recognize what is inevitable, and since I do not wish to better my personal situation by giving up the struggle, it seems wiser to look at the future calmly and await developments.

But between ourselves, it is hard to feel one's youth condemned in advance. I hoped that I would some day have my revenge in one form or another. But today I no longer believe that is possible for me. As a friend wrote me recently, "We are a generation that faded even before it had a chance to bloom." He is right. I actually feel as if I had been crushed by a wheel of history.

The difference between me and so many others is that they feel themselves crushed, and nothing more. I have the bitter privilege of understanding the complicated laws, the intricate machinery, and the learned maneuvers which have brought about this "traffic accident." Is that a consolation? Perhaps. Sometimes, just the same, I can't help thinking that it is hard to have dreamed of driving the "chariot of history" and then to find oneself suddenly under its wheels. . . . But on the whole, so far, I have kept my equilibrium.

I even believe that I shall survive all this because I just can't imagine this story unrolling itself without me. That would be too unjust. In spite of all our disillusionments and the slaps in the face that life has distributed so generously, most of us—and I in particular—always seek instinctively an "immanent" justice in the chain of events. That's why I can't imagine dying without seeing my husband again, and you; that would be too absurd, too unjust. Besides I couldn't die before I knew the final chapter. Is that what we call optimism? I wonder.

I am in good health despite the restrictions, the hunger, and the cold that threaten us this winter. Our morale is

good, thanks to the wonderful news that reaches us from Russia, and the hope which comes to us from Africa. You can scarcely realize the place that Stalingrad occupies in our life. That distant city has become a symbol. Our Stalingrad is still holding out. . . . What an example for us all. I still go to work every day. My semi-official position is a good camouflage for the underground work I am doing. But I don't know how long it will last. . . . The Fritzes, exasperated by their failures in the east, are becoming more fiendish than ever.

Take care of my husband's address. If anything happens to me our friends will find a way of letting you know. If you have any bad news for him, first tell N. This is my whole "will and testament."

For the last few months I have been corresponding with —. He is very pessimistic and must be unhappy. His visa for — was canceled as you know. That was a terrible blow; he hoped that once out of the country he could become an artilleryman again. He's a wonderful friend. From time to time he sends me some eggs in the mail. Do you know what an egg means to us? I can tell you very simply: when I bite into a hard-boiled egg I close my eyes and find myself transported to heaven.

One last word: It's not enough to liberate us "some day"; by then we shall all be dead and buried. You must come *soon*, or it will be too late. It's a question of life and death for our country, for Europe.

When shall we see the landing of Allied forces in France?

Paris, October, 1942

Mr. Wolfert Gains a Reader

Dear Sirs: I read with interest the New York Times editorial quoting Rickenbacker and Ira Wolfert, and considered it thought-provoking material. When I read Mr. Wolfert's letter in today's Times and learned that his material had been arbitrarily cut to pattern I resented it more than Mr. Wolfert. But when he stuck his chin out and dug in his heels, toward the end of his letter, concerning the Times's attitude toward the Popular Front, I decided any article he wrote would prove interesting.

So—will you enter a one-year subscription to *The Nation* for me and

begin it with the issue which contains Mr. Wolfert's article on Guadalcanal. And if you see him tell him that tempest in the *Times* won him a new audience.

A. V. REID

Fairfield, Conn., January 27

Those Secrets

Dear Sirs: Miss Kirchwey's editorials on the North African affair have expressed my own feelings so well that I wish to register my gratitude. I was so disappointed when PM and Raymond Gram Swing let me down.

Mr. Bendiner is sound, too. He couldn't have written that book about the State Department and then go over to the Quislings. Why more liberals are not able to make the necessary integration I cannot see. Everybody from the State Department down makes it all so complicated that the man in the street seems to think—just as he did when we were sending scrap to Japan—that the State Department must have good reasons, that we don't know enough to judge, etc. Whereas the truth is that there are a few fundamental judgments that the people should make, and no secrets the State Department has, whatever they are, can possibly change the simple right and wrong of those few fundamentals.

HELEN F. GIBB

Berkeley, Cal., January 15

Very Interesting

Dear Sirs: In the course of a speech before several hundred federal appointees and recruiting officers here the other day Harry J. Kranz, who was described in the *San Francisco Chronicle* as regional director of civil service, made this statement: "So acute is the present labor situation that governmental agencies, including the military, will have to adjust themselves to employing older women, Negroes, and the physically handicapped." Mr. Kranz's direct admission of the status of the Negro in government work is interesting.

A SUBSCRIBER

San Francisco, Cal., January 26

For a Vegetarian Future

Dear Sirs: Now that meat is scarce it is timely as well as patriotic to point to the fact that we have many vegetarians here, and all over the world. They not only enjoy health, but satisfaction in the knowledge of not contributing to the cruelty that goes with eating meat.

When Isadora Duncan crossed on a

cattleboat to England, the plaintive moo's of the cattle were constantly in her ears, and her brother became a vegetarian from then on.

Tolstoy, whose "War and Peace" is in great demand just now, also wrote a little book "The First Step" in which he says that the future belongs to the vegetarians.

Many believe that they will die if they cannot eat meat. It is true that it requires some will power, but nothing worth while in this world becomes ours without effort.

C. JACOBS

Berkeley, Cal., January 20

Is This a System?

Dear Sirs: It burned me up to read on the front page of the *New York Times* of January 28, 1943, of the elevation of one Ernst Hanfstaengl to the counsels of the State Department. We know enough to put in jail any poor halfwit who from sheer stupidity joined the Bund and heiled Hitler a little too enthusiastically. But here is a man who had the benefit of an American mother, a Harvard education, an American wife and native-born son; a man who lived in this country during the First World War, and on whom the eloquent Wilsonian exposition of democracy made so little impression that he found it in himself to use his brilliant mind in behalf of Hitler gangsterism for fully fifteen years, and even then quit, not from long overdue nausea, but because he was kicked out.

This man, tired obviously of Canadian prison fare, suddenly discovers a great love of the U. S. A., and our State Department, able to call on thousands of refugees, martyred in spirit and racked in body, for information about Germany, thrills to the acquisition of a Hanfstaengl.

ALBERT STRAUSS

New York, January 31

Taxes and Spending

Dear Sirs: Lord knows we will have plenty of distortion and misinformation from the press when Congress shortly begins to grapple with legislation to control inflation. Must *The Nation* add to the confusion?

I refer to Mr. Sturmthal's article in your issue of January 9 touching upon the respective plans of Keynes, Wallis, Weinstein, and Kalecki, each designed to sterilize excess purchasing power. Keynes's plan for compulsory saving is alleged to have "psychological advan-

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tages." But what of it if forced saving will not do the job, as England and Canada have already learned. In this country, forced saving would immediately become a substitute for present defense-bond and other voluntary savings (\$25 billion in 1942) and the net result would be zero.

The Treasury's spending-tax plan of last year is dusted off and served up by Sturmthal as the Wallis plan. But that plan was promptly rejected when the Treasury last offered it. Its fatal deficiencies were pointed out by *The Nation* itself in the issue of September 12. The Treasury plan is no more a "modification" of the Weinstein plan than a carbine is a modification of a tommy gun. Both have a common objective, but that is as much as can be said. Nor would an "extended" Weinstein plan "come close" to the Kalecki plan, which it resembles only in so far as both envisage the use of coupons. The Kalecki plan proposes to ration spending as we ration commodities—that is, a government-fixed quantity for everyone. It is naive politically. On the other hand, the Weinstein plan proposes to control inflation by a progressive tax on excess inflationary spending, which is quite another matter. Incidentally, the Kalecki plan, as described by Sturmthal, does not represent Kalecki's current thinking on the subject, for he revised it materially shortly after it was originally published.

The inflation thunderhead is gathering too rapidly these days to afford *The Nation's* readers the doubtful luxury of discussion on utopian or stale solutions. Unless cracked quickly, inflation will crack us. Time cannot be wasted on a politically impossible plan like that of Kalecki or a politically dead one like that of Wallis.

It is plain that the only feasible plan will be one capable of stopping harmful spending at the point of expenditure, realistic enough to use our existing price mechanism as a control device, flexible enough to permit spending in non-inflationary fields, and adaptable enough to deal effectively with the vagaries of a varying inflationary gap. By all means, let us have informative discussion along these lines.

BERNARD ALPERT

New York, January 14

Mr. Sturmthal Replies

Dear Sirs: Mr. Alpert seems to believe that discussing and criticizing three or four alternative and mutually exclusive plans means to advocate them. Of course I do nothing of the sort. Must Mr. Al-

pert create confusion where there is none?

I have pointed out that the Keynes plan could be defeated "by reducing . . . normal voluntary savings." Mr. Alpert's criticism thus merely repeats mine. I have not "dusted off" any plan at all. The Wallis plan was presented by its own author in the September issue of the *American Economic Review* and is by no means identical with the Treasury proposals as I pointed out at length in my article. Whether the spending tax is "politically dead" is an open question. I do know that various types are being discussed right now in Washington.

Again, so far as the Kalecki plan is concerned, Mr. Alpert merely repeats my own criticism, but he does it as if he were arguing against me. I called it "unacceptable"; he calls it "naive politically." I am aware of Kalecki's revision, and I suggested some further modifications to make the plan politically possible.

Mr. Alpert, I fear, is a bit confused so far as the relationship of the various plans is concerned, but I shall make a further effort to clarify the issues. The Wallis plan is as different from the Treasury sales tax as a protective tariff from a fiscal tariff. The first is primarily designed to prevent excess buying, and its rates are deliberately made so stiff as to bring minimum revenue. The Treasury plan, on the other hand, is a fiscal measure. In other words, Mr. Wallis hopes to prevent spending beyond the minimum, while the Treasury is looking forward to revenues from excess spending.

I did not say that the Treasury plan was a modification of the Weinstein plan, but that the "Wallis plan represents a modification of Jerome Weinstein's suggestions." Finally, both the Weinstein plan and the Kalecki plan operate with a government-allocated spending allowance. Mr. Weinstein prevents spending beyond this minimum by steeply progressive taxes, while the Kalecki plan in its original form tends to achieve the same end by a coupon system.

I agree, as probably everyone else would, with all but one of the generalities with which Mr. Alpert concludes. Disagreements as usual arise only when one tries to implement these principles in a concrete measure. I am not sure that I would accept one of Mr. Alpert's principles, that of using the price mechanism as a control device. This may mean depending upon rising prices to

curtail consumption—which is inflation. It may also mean allowing for changes in relative prices as I suggested in my article. Since I am not certain which of these Mr. Alpert has in mind, and I for one do not wish to confuse the reader, I shall not elaborate on this point.

ADOLF F. STURMTHAL

Annandale-on-Hudson, N. Y., Jan. 28

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